Discourse representation in context by Eijck, D.J.N. (Jan) van & Kamp, H.
Discourse Representation in Context
Jan van Eijck and Hans Kamp
January 7, 2010
1 Overview
Discourse representation in context is the attempt to capture certain aspects
of the interpretation of natural language texts that are beyond the mere
truth conditions of the text. Prime examples are interpretation of indefinites
and pronouns in context, and interpretation of tenses, in French and other
languages.
One of the debates surrounding the advent of discourse representation theory
(DRT, [37]) and file change semantics (FCS, [35]) had to do with the issue of
representationalism. Should we assume the representation structures to say
something about what goes on in the mind of the interpreter, or not. On
this issue, the followers of the Montague tradition tend to have strongly anti-
mentalist views. Semantics, in the Montagovian perspective, is not about
what goes on in the mind, but about how language relates to reality.
Montague tried to settle the issue of representation languages (‘logical form’)
once and for all by means of a careful demonstration that immediate inter-
pretation of natural language fragments in appropriate models, without an
intervening logical form, was possible. DRT and FSC, in their original pre-
sentations, re-introduced logical forms into the picture. The first attempts
at rational reconstruction of DRT and FCS were geared at showing that
the representation language (the boxes of DRT) could be eliminated again.
This led to the development of compositional versions of DRT such as dy-
namic predicate logic (DPL), and dynamic versions of Montague grammar
based on DPL. The snag was that these rational reconstructions were not
quite faithful to the original enterprise. See [25] for a detailed account of
the relationship between DRT and DPL, in the context of a historical study
1
of dynamic logics in computer science and natural language analysis. An
overview of DRT from the viewpoint of representationalism can be found in
[40].
Anti-mentalism is less fashionable nowadays. Indeed, many researchers have
come to view natural language analysis as a branch of cognitive science.
But this new view creates new obligations. If one takes this connection
with cognition seriously, one has to take on the burden of showing that the
building of discourse representations, as it goes on in the theory, somehow
corresponds with what goes on in the mind. It seems fair to say that this is
a challenge that has yet to be met.
This paper is an update to our previous overview [24]. We will first introduce
the purpose of the overall enterprise of discourse representation. Next, we
focus on some technical issues, in order to clarify what goes on essentially
when text is interpreted in context.
2 Interpretation of Text in Context
The fundamental idea behind the theory of the semantics of coherent multi-
sentence discourse and text that is presented in this chapter—Discourse
Representation Theory, or DRT for short—is that each new sentence S of a
discourse is interpreted in the context provided by the sentences preceding
it. The result of this interpretation is that the context is updated with
the contribution made by S; often an important part of this process is that
anaphoric elements of S are hooked up to elements that are present in the
context. An implication of this conception of text interpretation is that one
and the same structure serves simultaneously as content and as context—as
content of the sentences that have been interpreted already and as context
for the sentence that is to be interpreted next. This double duty imposes
special constraints on logical form, which are absent when, as in most older
conceptions of semantics and pragmatics, the contents and contexts are kept
separate.
The initial problem that motivated the present theory is the interpretation
of nominal and temporal anaphora in discourse. The key idea in the way
of thinking about the semantics of discourse in context exemplified in Heim
[35] and Kamp [37] is that each new sentence or phrase is interpreted as
an addition to, or ‘update’ of, the context in which it is used and that this
update often involves connections between elements from the sentence or
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phrase with elements from the context.
In the approach of Kamp [37], which we will follow more closely here than
the largely equivalent approach of Heim [35], this idea is implemented in
the form of interpretation rules—each associated with a particular lexical
item or syntactic construction. When applied to a given sentence S, these
rules identify the semantic contributions which S makes to the context C
in which S is used and add these to C. In this way C is transformed into a
new context, which carries the information contributed by S as well as the
information that was part of the context already. The result can then serve
as context for the interpretation of the sentence following S (in the given
discourse or text), which leads to yet another context, and so on until the
entire discourse or text has been interpreted.
An important aspect of this kind of updating of contexts is the introduction
of elements—so-called reference markers or discourse referents—that can
serve as antecedents to anaphoric expressions in subsequent discourse. These
reference markers play a key part in the the context structures posited by
DRT, the so-called Discourse Representation Structures or DRSs.
With its emphasis on representing and interpreting discourse in context,
discourse representation theory has been instrumental in the emergence of
a dynamic perspective on natural language semantics, where the centre of
the stage, occupied so long by the concept of truth with respect to appro-
priate models, has been replaced by context change conditions, with truth
conditions defined in terms of those. Thus, under the influence of discourse
representation theory, many traditional Montague grammarians have made
the switch from static to dynamic semantics (see the Chapter on Dynamics
in this Handbook). This shift has considerably enriched the enterprise of for-
mal semantics, by bringing areas formerly belonging to informal pragmatics
within its compass.
In the next section we will first look at some examples of DRSs and at the
considerations which have led to their specific form. After that we will look
more closely at the relationship between DRSs and the syntactic structure of
sentences, discourses or texts from which they can be derived. This will lead
us naturally to the much debated question whether the theory presented here
is compositional. The compositionality issue will force us to look carefully at
the operations by means of which DRSs can be put together from minimal
building blocks. Next we will show, by developing a toy example, what a
compositional discourse semantics for a fragment of natural language may
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look like. This is followed by sample treatments of quantification, tense and
aspect. The chapter ends with some pointers to the literature on further
extensions of the approach and to connections with related approaches.
3 The Problem of Anaphoric Linking in Context
The semantic relationship between personal pronouns and their antecedents
was long perceived as being of two kinds: a pronoun either functions as an
individual constant coreferential with its antecedent or it acts as a variable
bound by its antecedent. However, in the examples (1)—(4) below, neither
of these two possibilities seems to provide a correct account of how pronoun
and antecedent are related.
(1) A man1 entered. He1 smiled.
(2) Every man who meets a nice woman1 smiles at her1.
(3) If a man1 enters, he1 smiles.
(4) Hob believes a witch1 blighted his mare. Nob believes she1 killed his
sow.
In these examples we have used subscripts and superscripts to coindex
anaphoric pronouns and their intended antecedents.
The first option—of pronoun and antecedent being coreferential—does not
work for the simple reason that the antecedent does not refer (as there is
no one particular thing that can be counted as the referent!); so a fortiori
antecedent and pronoun cannot corefer (that is, refer to the same thing).
The second option, the bound variable analysis, runs into problems because
the pronoun seems to be outside the scope of its antecedent. For instance,
in (1) the antecedent of the pronoun is an indefinite noun phrase occurring
in the preceding sentence. In the approaches which see pronouns as either
coreferring terms or bound variables, indefinite NPs are viewed as existential
quantifiers whose scope does not extend beyond the sentence in which they
occur. In such an approach there is no hope of the pronoun getting properly
bound. Examples (2)–(4) present similar difficulties. Example (2) is ar-
guably ambiguous in that a nice woman may be construed either as having
wide or as having narrow scope with respect to every man. If a nice woman
is construed as having narrow scope, i.e. as having its scope restricted to the
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relative clause, then the pronoun won’t be bound; the phrase can bind the
pronoun if it is given wide scope, as in that case its scope is the entire sen-
tence, but this leads to an interpretation which, though perhaps marginally
possible, is clearly not the preferred reading of (2). We find much the same
problem with (3): in order that the indefinite a man bind the pronoun he,
it must be construed as having scope over the conditional as a whole, and
not just over the if-clause; but again, this yields a reading that is marginal
at best, while the preferred reading is not available.
Sentences with the patterns of (2) and (3) have reached the modern semantic
literature through Geach [31], who traces them back to the Middle Ages
and beyond. Geach’s discussion revolves around examples with donkeys, so
these sentences became known in the literature as donkey sentences. Also
due to Geach are sentences like (4), which pose a binding problem across a
sentential boundary, complicated by the fact that antecedent and anaphoric
element occur in the scopes of different attitude predications, with distinct
subjects.
Problems like the ones we encountered with (1)—(4) arise not just with
pronouns. There are several other types of expressions with anaphoric uses
that present essentially the same difficulties to the traditional ways of view-
ing the relationship between natural language and logic. First, there are
other anaphoric noun phrases besides pronouns, viz. definite descriptions
and demonstratives; and these also occur in the contexts where the prob-
lems we have just noted arise. Moreover, as was remarked already more
than twenty years ago in Partee [52], there are striking similarities in the
behaviour of anaphoric pronouns and tenses, and it turns out that the inter-
pretation of tense involves the same sort of anaphoric dependencies which
(1)–(4) exhibit. More precisely, the past tense is often to be understood as
referring to some particular time in the past (rather than meaning ‘sometime
in the past’) and more often than not this particular time is to be recovered
from the context in which the given past tense sentence is used.
(5) John entered the room. He switched on the light.
(6) Whenever John entered the room, he switched on the light.
In (5) the switching time is understood as temporally related to the time
at which John entered the room (presumably the time of switching was
directly after the time of entering) and a full interpretation of (5) needs
to make this explicit. A quantificational sentence such as (6) suggests the
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same relationship between switching times and entering times; and insofar
as the tense of the main clause is to be interpreted as anaphoric to that of
the whenever-clause, this anaphoric connection raises the same questions as
those of (2) and (3).
4 Basic Ideas of Discourse Representation
The central concepts of DRT are best explained with reference to simple
examples such as (1) in the previous section. The logical content of (1)
appears to be that there was some man who entered and (then) smiled.
That is, the content of (1) is what in standard predicate logic would be
expressed by an existential quantification over material coming in part from
the first and in another part from the second sentence of (1), roughly as in
(7).
(7) ∃x(man (x) ∧ entered (x) ∧ smiled (x))
As observed in the last section, according to DRT the interpretation of (1)
results from a process in which an interpretation is obtained for the first
sentence, which then serves as context for the interpretation of the second
sentence. The interpretation of the second sentence transforms this context
into a new context structure, the content of which is essentially that of (7).
The problem with (1) is that the first sentence has an existential interpreta-
tion and thus must in some way involve an existential quantifier, and that
the contribution which the second sentence makes to the interpretation of
(1) must be within the scope of that quantifier. Given the basic tenets of
DRT, this means that (i) the first sentence of (1) must get assigned a rep-
resentation, i.e. a DRS, K1 which captures the existential interpretation of
that sentence; and (ii) this DRS K1 must be capable of acting as context
for the interpretation of the second sentence in such a way that this second
interpretation process transforms it into a DRS K2 representing the truth
conditions identified by (7). (i) entails that the reference marker introduced
by the indefinite NP a man—let it be x—must get an existential interpreta-
tion within K1; and (ii) entails that it is nevertheless available subsequently
as antecedent for the pronoun he. Finally, after x has been so exploited in
the interpretation of the second sentence, it must then receive once more an
existential interpretation within the resulting DRS K2.
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Heim [35] uses the metaphor of a filing cabinet for this process. The es-
tablished representation structure K1 is a set of file cards, and additions to
the discourse effect a new structure K2, which is the result of changing the
file in the light of the new information. Here is how DRT deals with these
desiderata. The DRS K1 is as given in (8).
(8)
x
man x
entered x
This can also be rendered in canonical set-theoretical notation, as in (9).
(9) ({x}, {man x, entered x})
Precisely how this DRS is derived from the syntactic structure of the first
sentence of (1), and how DRS construction from sentences and texts works
generally is discussed in Section 10. For now, suffice it to note that the
reference marker x gets introduced when the NP a man is interpreted and
that this interpretation also yields the two conditions man(x) and entered(x),
expressing that any admissible value a for x must be a man and that this
man was one who entered.
A DRS like (8) can be viewed as a kind of ‘model’ of the situation which the
represented discourse describes. The modelled situation contains at least
one individual a, corresponding to the reference marker x, which satisfies
the two conditions contained in (8), i.e. a is a man and a is someone who
entered.
When a DRS is used as context in the interpretation of some sentence S,
its reference markers may serve as antecedents for anaphoric NPs occurring
in S. In the case of our example we have the following. (8), serving as
context for the second sentence of (1), makes x available as antecedent for
the pronoun he. That is, the interpretation of he links the reference marker
it introduces, y say, to the marker x for the intended antecedent, something
we express by means of the equational condition y .= x. In addition, the
interpretation step yields, as in the case of the indefinite a man, a condition
expressing the clausal predication which involves he as argument. Through
the application of this principle (8) gets expanded to the DRS (10), which
represents the content of all of (1).
7
(10)
x y
man x
enter x
y .= x
smiled y
DRS (10) models situations in which there is at least one individual that is
a man, that entered and that smiled. It is easy to see that these are precisely
the situations which satisfy the predicate formula (7). (This claim will be
made formal by the model theory for DRSs, to be presented in Section 5.)
As illustrated by the above examples (8) and (10), a DRS generally consists
of two parts, (i) a set of reference markers, the universe of the DRS, and (ii)
a set of conditions, its condition set. There are some other general points
which our example illustrates:
1. The reference markers in the universe of a DRS all get an existential
interpretation;
2. All reference markers in the universe of a context DRS are available
as anaphoric antecedents to pronouns and other anaphoric expressions
that are interpreted within this context;
3. The interpretation of a sentence S in the context provided by a DRS
K results in a new DRS K ′, which captures not only the content
represented by K but also the content of S, as interpreted with respect
to K.
It should be clear that DRSs such as (8) and (10) can only represent infor-
mation that has the logical form of an existentially quantified conjunction
of atomic predications. But there is much information that is not of this
form. This is so, in particular, for the information expressed by (3). So the
DRS for (3) will have to make use of representational devices different from
those that we have used up to this point.
The DRT conception of conditional information is this. The antecedent of
a conditional describes a situation, and the conditional asserts that this sit-
uation must also satisfy the information specified in its consequent. When
conditionals are seen from this perspective, it is not surprising that the
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interpretation of their consequents may use the interpretations of their an-
tecedents as contexts much in the way the interpretation of a sentence S
may build upon the interpretation assigned to the sentences preceding it in
the discourse to which it belongs; for the consequent extends the situation
description provided by the antecedent in essentially the same way in which
S extends the situation described by its predecessors.
In the case of (3) this means that the DRS (8), which represents its an-
tecedent (see the discussion of (1) above), can be exploited in the interpre-
tation of the consequent, just as (8), as interpretation of the first sentence
of (1), supported the interpretation of the second sentence of (1). To make
this work out, we need a suitable representation for the consequent. This
turns out to be (11).
(11)
smile x
To obtain a representation of (3), (8) and (11) must be combined in a
way which reveals the conditional connection between them. We represent
this combination by a double arrow in between the two DRSs. The result
K ⇒ K ′, where K and K ′ are the two DRSs to be combined, is a DRS
condition (a complex condition as opposed to the simple DRS conditions we
have encountered so far). The DRS for a conditional sentence such as (3)
will consist just of such a condition and nothing else.
Intuitively the meaning of a condition K ⇒ K ′ is that a situation satisfying
K also satisfies K ′. This is indeed the semantics we adopt for such conditions
(for details see Section 5). Applying this to the case of (3) we get the
representation (12).
(12)
x
man x
enter x
⇒
smile x
Conditions of the form K ⇒ K ′ illustrate an important feature of DRT:
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The logical role played by a reference marker depends on the DRS-universe
to which it belongs. Markers belonging to the universe of the main DRS get
an existential interpretation—this is, we saw, a consequence of the principle
that a DRS is true if it is possible to find individuals corresponding to the
reference markers in the DRS universe which satisfy its conditions. This
principle, however, applies only to the reference markers in the main DRS
universe. The logic of reference markers in subordinate universes, such as
for instance x in (12), is determined by the principles governing the complex
DRS conditions to which they belong. Thus the semantics of conditions of
the form K ⇒ K ′ implies that for all individuals corresponding to reference
markers in the universe of K which satisfy the conditions of K it is the
case that K ′ is satisfiable as well. Thus the ⇒-condition of (12) has the
meaning that for every individual corresponding to the marker x—that is,
for every man that enters—the right hand side DRS of (12) is satisfied, i.e.
that individual smiles. Reference markers in the left hand side universe of
an ⇒-condition thus get a universal, not an existential interpretation.
It is worth noting explicitly the ingredients to this solution of the semantic
dilemma posed by conditionals like (3). Crucial to the solution are:
1. the combination of the principles of DRS construction, which assign
to conditional sentences such as (3) representations such as (12), and
2. the semantics for ⇒-conditions that has just been described.
Like any other DRS, (12) is a pair consisting of a set of reference markers
and a set of conditions. But in (12) the first of these sets is empty. In par-
ticular, the reference marker x which does occur in (12) belongs not to the
universe of the ‘main’ DRS of (12) but to that of a subordinate DRS, which
itself is a constituent of some DRS condition occurring in (12). One impor-
tant difference between reference markers in such subordinate positions and
those belonging to the universe of the main DRS is that only the latter are
accessible as antecedents for anaphoric pronouns in subsequent sentences.
In general, in order that a reference marker can serve as antecedent to a sub-
sequent pronoun, it must be accessible from the position that the pronoun
occupies. Compare for instance the discourses (13) and (14).
(13) A man came in. He smiled. He was holding a flower in his right hand.
(14) If a man comes in, he smiles. ?He is holding a flower in his right hand.
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While in (13) the second he is as unproblematic as the first he, in (14) the
second he is hard or impossible to process. This difference is reflected by the
fact that in the DRS for the first two sentences of (13) the reference marker
for a man belongs to the universe of the main DRS and so is accessible to
the pronoun of the last sentence, whereas in (14) this is not so.
The rules for processing sentences in the context of a representation structure
impose formal constraints on availability of discourse referents for anaphoric
linking. The set of available markers consists of the markers of the current
structure, plus the markers of structures that can be reached from the cur-
rent one by a series of steps in the directions left, (i.e. from the consequent
of a pair K ⇒ K ′ to the antecedent), and up, (i.e. from a structure to an
encompassing structure).
For universally quantified sentences such as (2) DRT offers an analysis that
closely resembles its treatment of conditionals. According to this analysis
a universally quantifying NP imposes a conditional connection between its
own descriptive content and the information expressed by the predication in
which it participates as argument phrase; and this connection is interpreted
in the same way as the⇒-conditions that the theory uses to represent condi-
tional sentences. In particular, (2) gets an analysis in which any individual
satisfying the descriptive content man who meets a nice woman, i.e. any in-
dividual corresponding to the reference marker x in the DRS (15), satisfies
the DRS representing the main predication of (2). According to this way of
looking at quantification, the descriptive content of the quantifying phrase
can be taken as presupposed for purposes of interpreting the predication in
which the phrase partakes, just as the antecedent of a conditional can be
taken as given when interpreting its consequent. Thus, just as we saw for the
consequent of the conditional (3), the construction of the DRS for the main
predication of (2) may make use of information encoded in the ‘descriptive
content’ DRS (15). The result is the DRS in (16).
(15)
x y
man x
woman y
nice y
meet (x,y)
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(16)
u
u .= y
smiles-at (x,u)
To get a representation of (2), DRSs (15) and (16) have to be combined
into a single DRS condition. It is clear that ⇒ has the desired effect. The
result is (17).
(17)
x y
man x
woman y
nice y
meet (x,y)
⇒
u
u .= y
smiles-at (x,u)
The constraints on marker accessibility are used to account for the awk-
wardness of anaphoric links as in (18).
(18) *If every man1 meets a nice woman2 , he1 smiles at her2.
The difference between pronominal anaphora and the variable binding we
find in classical logic is also nicely illustrated by anaphora involving the
word other. Consider e.g. (19).
(19) A man walked in. Another man followed him.
Here another man is anaphoric to a man, but the sense is that the two men
should be different, not that they are the same. In other words, while any
phrase of the form another CN must, just as an anaphorically used pronoun,
find an antecedent in its context of interpretation, the semantic significance
of the link is just the opposite here. The DRS for (19) is (20).
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(20)
x y z
man x
walk-in x
y 6= x
man y
z .= x
follow (y,z)
Note that the representation of other-anaphora always needs two reference
markers, one introduced by the anaphoric NP itself and one for the an-
tecedent; there is no question here of replacing the former marker by the
latter (that is: eliminating the y at the top of (20) and the inequality y 6= x
and replacing the other occurrences of y by x), as that would force the two
men to be the same, rather than different. In this regard other-anaphora
differs from pronoun anaphora, for which the substitution treatment yields
representations that are equivalent to the ones we have been constructing
above.
One reason for preferring the treatment of pronoun anaphora we have adopted
is that it brings out the similarity as well as the difference between pronouns
and phrases with other : In both cases interpretation involves the choice of a
suitable antecedent. But the ‘links’ between the chosen antecedent and the
marker for the anaphoric NP are different in nature: they express equality
in one case, inequality in the other.
We have said something about the interpretation of three kinds of NPs:
indefinite descriptions, anaphoric pronouns and quantified NPs, and we have
introduced linking as a central theme in DRT. More about quantification
in Section 11. We will now briefly turn to definite descriptions. One of
the most obvious facts about them, but a fact systematically ignored or
played down in the classical theories of denoting phrases (Frege [29], Russell
[58], Strawson [65]), is that, like pronouns, definite descriptions often act as
anaphoric expressions.
Indeed, there seems to be a kind of interchangeability in the use of pro-
nouns and descriptions, with a description taking the place of a pronoun
in positions where the latter would create an unwanted ambiguity; thus, in
discourses like (21) the use of a definite description in the second sentence
serves to disambiguate the intended anaphoric link.
(21) A man and a boy came in. The man/he(?) smiled.
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Anaphoric definite descriptions are, like pronouns, linked to existing dis-
course referents, and thus, like pronouns, they impose certain conditions
on the context in which they are used: the context must contain at least
one discourse referent that can serve as an antecedent. In this sense both
pronouns and anaphoric definite descriptions may be said to carry a certain
presupposition: only when the context satisfies this presupposition is it pos-
sible to interpret the pronoun, or to interpret the description anaphorically.
The descriptive content then serves as information to guide the anaphora
resolution process. This will permit anaphora resolution in cases like (21).
Matters are not always this simple, however. Definite descriptions have uses
that can hardly be described as anaphoric. For instance, in (22), the de-
scription the street is certainly not anaphoric in the strict sense of the word,
for there is no antecedent part of the given discourse which has introduced
an element that the description can be linked up with.
(22) A man was walking down the street. He was smiling.
It is argued in Heim [35] that the use of a definite description is a means for
the speaker to convey that he takes the referent of the description to be in
some sense familiar. The hearer who is already acquainted with the street
that is intended as the referent of the street by the speaker of (22) may be
expected to interpret the description as referring to this street; in such cases
speaker and hearer are said to share a common ground (see e.g. Stalnaker
[64]) which includes the street in question, and it is this which enables the
hearer to interpret the speaker’s utterance as he meant it. Such common
grounds can also be represented in the form of DRSs. Thus, the common
ground just referred to will contain, at a minimum, a component of the form
(23), where we assume that the marker u in (23) is anchored to a suitable
object (the street that speaker and hearer have in mind).
(23)
u
street u
On the assumption of such a ‘common ground DRS’ (including a suitable
anchor) it becomes possible to view the NP the street of (22) as anaphoric.
Interpretation of (22) will then be relative to the context DRS (23) and the
interpretation of its definite description will yield, by the same principle that
governs the interpretation of the man in (21), a DRS like (24).
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(24)
u x v y
street u
man x
v .= u
street v
was-walking-down (x,v)
y .= x
was-smiling y
This way of dealing with definite descriptions such as the street in (24) may
seem to restore uniformity to the analysis of definites. An important differ-
ence between definite descriptions and pronouns remains, however. Definite
descriptions can be linked much more easily than pronouns to objects that
are implicit in the common ground, but have not been explicitly introduced
by earlier parts of the same discourse.
To assimilate the use of definite descriptions as unique identifiers (the use
that Frege and Russell focus on to the exclusion of all others) to the present
anaphoric analysis one must allow for accommodation. When the context
available to the hearer does not contain a representation of the referent of a
definite description, he may accommodate this context so that it now does
contain such a representation, and then proceed as if the representation had
been there all along. However, under what conditions precisely accommo-
dation is possible is still a largely unsolved problem.
Interesting cases where the anaphoric account and the unique identifica-
tion account of definite description have to be combined are the so-called
‘bridging descriptions’, as in (25) and (26).
(25) (Yesterday) an M.P. was killed. The murderer got away.
(26) Usually when an M.P. is killed, the murderer gets away.
In (25) the murderer is naturally interpreted as referring to the murderer of
the M.P. mentioned in the preceding sentence. In other words, the context
provides a referent x, and the definite description is interpreted as the unique
individual who murdered x. This account also works for (26), where x varies
over murdered M.P.s, and the definite description ranges over the set of
unique murderers for all those x.
We conclude with a brief remark on proper names. As has been emphasised
in the philosophical literature (see in particular Kripke [46]) a proper name
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has no descriptive content, or at any rate its descriptive content plays no
essential part in the way it refers. One consequence of this is that a name
cannot have more than one referential value (a point which should not be
confused with the evident fact that many names—Fred, Fido, John Smith,
Fayetteville—are many ways ambiguous). This means that a name cannot
have the sort of anaphoric use which we found with the murderer in (25)
and (26), and that the antecedent to which the reference marker for a name
will have to be linked will always be a marker in the main universe of the
context DRS. Logically speaking, therefore, a proper name will always have
‘maximally wide scope’. One might think about this process in several ways.
One might assume, as in the construction rule for proper names in Kamp
[37], that the processing of a proper name always leads to the introduction
of a marker in the top DRS, even if the name gets processed in a subordinate
DRS somewhere way down. Or one might assume an external element in
the semantics of proper names, namely the presence of external anchors:
reference markers that are already in place in the top box of a DRS. Any
proper name, then, comes equipped with its fixed anaphoric index for linking
the name to its anchor. This is the approach we will follow in Section 10.
5 Discourse Representation Structures
It is now time to turn to formal details. Let A be a set of constants, and
U a set of reference markers or discourse referents (variables, in fact). We
also assume that a set of predicate letters with their arities is given. In the
following definition, c ranges over A, v over the set U , and P over the set of
predicates.
Definition 1 (DRSs; preliminary definition)
terms t ::= v | c
conditions C ::= > | Pt1 · · · tk | v .= t | v 6= t | ¬D
DRSs D ::= ({v1, . . . , vn}, {C1, . . . , Cm})
Note that this definition of the representation language is provisional; it will
be modified in Section 7. We introduce the convention that
({v1, . . . , vn}, {C1, . . . , Cm})⇒ D
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is shorthand for
¬({v1, . . . , vn}, {C1, . . . , Cm,¬D}).
As in the previous sections DRSs will sometimes be presented in the box
notation:
DRSs D ::=
v1 · · · vn
C1
...
Cm
The abbreviation D1 ⇒ D2 is rendered in box format by the agreement to
write (27) as (28).
(27) ¬
v1 · · · vn
C1
...
Cm
¬
· · ·
...
(28)
v1 · · · vn
C1
...
Cm
⇒
· · ·
...
Conditions can be atoms, links, or complex conditions. Complex conditions
are negations or implications. As the implications are abbreviations for
special negations, we can assume that all complex conditions are negations.
An atom is the symbol > or a predicate name applied to a number of terms
(constants or discourse referents), a link is an expression v .= t or v 6= t,
where v is a marker, and t is either a constant or a marker. The clause for
complex conditions uses recursion: a complex condition is a condition of the
form ¬D, where D is a discourse representation structure.
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We will first give a static truth definition for discourse representation struc-
tures. Later on, when discussing the problem of compositionality for DRSs,
we turn to a context change formulation of those same conditions. Call a
first order model M = 〈M, I〉 (we assume the domain M is non-empty) an
appropriate model for DRS D if I maps the n–place predicate names in the
atomic conditions of D to n–place relations on M , the individual constants
occurring in the link conditions of D to members of M , and (here is the
recursive part of the definition) M is also appropriate for the DRSs in the
complex conditions of D.
Let M = 〈M, I〉 be an appropriate model for DRS D. An assignment s for
M = 〈M, I〉 is a mapping of the set of reference markers U to elements of
M . The term valuation determined byM and s is the function VM,s defined
by VM,s(t) := I(t) if t ∈ A and VM,s(t) := s(t) if t ∈ U . In the following
definition we use s[X]s′ for: s′ agrees with s except possibly on the values
of the members of X.
Definition 2 (Assignments verifying a DRS)
An assignment s verifies D = ({v1, . . . , vn}, {C1, . . . , Cm}) in M if there
is an assignment s′ with s[{v1, . . . , vn}]s′ which satisfies every member of
{C1, . . . , Cm} in M.
Definition 3 (Assignments satisfying a condition)
1. s always satisfies > in M.
2. s satisfies P (t1, . . . , tn) in M iff 〈VM,s(t1), . . . , VM,s(tn)〉 ∈ I(P ).
3. s satisfies v .= t in M iff s(v) = VM,s(t).
4. s satisfies v 6= t in M iff s(v) 6= VM,s(t).
5. s satisfies ¬D in M iff s does not verify D in M.
Definition 4 Structure D is true in M if there is an assignment which
verifies D in M.
Note that it follows from definition 4 that ({x}, {Pxy}) is true in M iff
({x, y}, {Pxy}) is true inM. In other words: free variables are existentially
quantified.
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We leave it to the reader to check that the definition of verifying assignments
yields the following requirement for conditions of the form D1 ⇒ D2:
• s satisfies D1 ⇒ D2 in M, where D1 = (X, {C1, . . . , Ck}), iff every
assignment s′ with s[X]s′ which satisfies C1, . . . , Ck in M verifies D2
in M.
These definitions are easily modified to take anchors (partial assignments of
values to fixed referents) into account. This is done by focusing on assign-
ments extending a given anchor.
It is not difficult to see that the expressive power of basic DRT is the same
as that of first order logic. In fact, there is an easy recipe for translating
representation structures to formulae of predicate logic. Assuming that dis-
course referents can do duty as predicate logical variables, the atomic and
link conditions of a representation structure are atomic formulae of predi-
cate logic. The translation function ◦ which maps representation structures
to formulae of predicate logic is defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Translation from DRT to FOL)
• For DRSs: if D = ({v1, . . . , vn}, {C1, . . . , Cm}) then
D◦ := ∃v1 · · · ∃vn(C◦1 ∧ · · · ∧ C◦m).
• For atomic conditions (i.e. atoms or links): C◦ := C.
• For negations: (¬D)◦ := ¬D◦.
It follows from this that the translation instruction for implications becomes
(assume D1 = ({v1, . . . , vn}, {C1, . . . , Cm}))
• (D1 ⇒ D2)◦ := ∀v1 · · · ∀vn((C◦1 ∧ · · · ∧ C◦m)→ D◦2).
The following is now easy to show:
Proposition 6 s verifies D in M iff M, s |= D◦, where |= is Tarski’s
definition of satisfaction for first order predicate logic.
It is also not difficult to give a meaning preserving translation from first
order predicate logic to basic DRT. In the following definition, φ• is the
DRS corresponding to the predicate logical formula φ, and φ•1 and φ•2 are its
first and second components.
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Definition 7 (Translation from FOL to DRT)
• For atomic formulas: C• := (∅, C).
• For conjunctions: (φ ∧ ψ)• := (∅, {φ•, ψ•}).
• For negations: (¬φ)• := (∅,¬φ•).
• For quantifications: (∃vφ)• := (φ•1 ∪ {v}, φ•2).
Proposition 8 M, s |= φ iff s verifies φ• in M, where |= is Tarski’s defi-
nition of satisfaction for first order predicate logic.
The difference between first order logic and basic DRT has nothing to do
with expressive power but resides entirely in the different way in which
DRT handles context. The importance of this new perspective on context
and context change is illustrated by the following examples with their DRS
representations.
(29) Someone did not smile. He was angry.
(30) Not everyone smiled. *He was angry.
A suitable DRS representation (ignoring tense) for the first sentence of (29)
is the following.
(31)
x
person x
¬
smile x
Here we see that the pronoun he in the next sentence of (29) can be resolved
by linking it to the marker x occurring in the top box. The anaphoric
possibilities of (30) are different, witness its DRS representation (32).
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(32) ¬ x
person x
⇒
smile x
In this case there is no suitable marker available as an antecedent for he in
the next sentence of (30).
What we see here is that DRSs with the same truth conditions, such as (31)
and (32), may nevertheless be semantically different in an extended sense.
The context change potentials of (31) and (32) are different, as the former
creates a context for subsequent anaphoric links whereas the latter does not.
This is as it should be, of course, as the pronoun in the second sentence of
(29) can pick up the reference marker in the first sentence, but the pronoun
in the second sentence of (30) cannot. The comparison of (31) and (32)
illustrates that meaning in the narrow sense of truth conditions does not
exhaust the concept of meaning for DRSs. The extended sense of meaning
in which (31) and (32) are different can be informally phrased as follows:
(31) creates a new context that can furnish an antecedent for a pronoun
is subsequent discourse, (32) does not. This is because (31) changes the
context, whereas (32) does not.
6 The Static and Dynamic Meaning of Represen-
tation Structures
DRT has often been criticized for failing to be ‘compositional’. It is impor-
tant to see what this criticism could mean and to distinguish between two
possible ways it could be taken. According to the first of these DRT fails
to provide a direct compositional semantics for the natural language frag-
ments to which it is applied. Given the form in which DRT was originally
presented, this charge is justifiable, or at least it was so in the past. We will
address it in Section 10. In its second interpretation the criticism pertains
to the formalism of DRT itself. This objection is groundless. As Definitions
2 and 3 more or less directly imply, the formal language of Definition 1 is
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as compositional as standard predicate logic. We can make the point more
explicit by rephrasing Definitions 2 and 3 as a definition of the semantic
values [[ ]]M that is assigned to each of the terms, conditions and DRSs of
the DRT language by an appropriate model M. As values for DRSs in M
we use pairs 〈X,F 〉 consisting of a finite set of reference markers X ⊆ U
and a set of functions F ⊆MU , and as meanings for conditions we use sets
of assignments.
Definition 9 (Semantics of DRSs)
[[({v1, . . . , vn}, {C1, . . . , Cm})]]M := ({v1, . . . , vn}, [[C1]]M ∩ · · · ∩ [[Cm]]M).
Definition 10 (Semantics of conditions)
1. [[P (t1, . . . , tn)]]M := {s ∈MU | 〈VM,s(t1), . . . , VM,s(tn)〉 ∈ I(P )}.
2. [[v .= t]]M := {s ∈MU | s(v) = VM,s(t)}.
3. [[v 6= t]]M := {s ∈MU | s(v) 6= VM,s(t)}.
4. [[¬D]]M := {s ∈MU | for no s′ ∈MU : s[X]s′ and s′ ∈ F},
where (X,F ) = [[D]]M.
To see the connection with the earlier definition of verification, 2, note that
the following proposition holds:
Proposition 11
• s verifies D in M iff [[D]]M = 〈X,F 〉 and there is an s′ ∈ MU with
s[X]s′ and s′ ∈ F .
• D is true in M iff [[D]]M = 〈X,F 〉 and F 6= ∅.
If one asks what are the DRS components of a DRS ({v1, . . . , vn}, {C1, . . . , Cm}),
then the answer has to be: there aren’t any. For those who do not like this
answer, it turns out to be possible to view DRSs as built from atomic build-
ing blocks which are also DRSs. This was first pointed out by Zeevat [74].
The DRS language is now given in a slightly different way:
Definition 12 (Building DRSs from atomic DRSs)
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1. If v is a reference marker, ({v}, ∅) is a DRS.
2. If (∅, {>}) is a DRS.
3. If P is an n-ary predicate and t1, . . . , tn are terms,
then (∅, {P (t1, . . . , tn)}) is a DRS.
4. If v is a reference marker and t is a term, then (∅, {v .= t}) is a DRS.
5. If v is a reference marker and t is a term, then (∅, {v 6= t}) is a DRS.
6. If D is a DRS, then (∅,¬D) is a DRS.
7. If D = (X,C) and D′ = (X ′, C ′) are DRSs,
then (X ∪X ′, C ∪ C ′) is a DRS.
8. Nothing else is a DRS.
It is clear that this defines the same DRS language. Let us use − for the
construction step that forms negated DRSs (that is, we use −D for (∅,¬D))
and ⊕ for the operation of merging the universes and the constraint sets
of two DRSs (that is, if D = (X,C) and D′ = (X ′, C ′), then D ⊕ D′ :=
(X ∪X ′, C ∪ C ′)).
Under this DRS definition, DRSs have become structurally ambiguous. DRS
({x}, {Px,Qx}), for example, has several possible construction histories:
• ({x}, ∅)⊕ ((∅, {Px})⊕ (∅, {Qx})),
• ({x}, ∅)⊕ ((∅, {Qx})⊕ (∅, {Px})),
• (({x}, ∅)⊕ (∅, {Px}))⊕ (∅, {Qx}),
• and so on.
The DRS semantics to be given next ensures that these structural ambigui-
ties are harmless: the semantic operation corresponding to ⊕ is commutative
and associative.
The following two semantic operations correspond to the syntactic oper-
ations ⊕,− on DRSs (note that we overload the notation by calling the
semantic operations by the same names as their syntactic counterparts):
〈X,F 〉 ⊕ 〈Y,G〉 := 〈X ∪ Y, F ∩G〉
−〈X,F 〉 := 〈∅, {g ∈MU | ¬∃f ∈ F with g[X]f}〉
The DRS semantics now looks like this:
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Definition 13
1. [[({v}, ∅)]]M := ({v},MU ).
2. [[(∅, {>})]]M := (∅,MU ).
3. [[(∅, {Pt1, . . . , tn})]]M := (∅, {f ∈ MU | 〈VM,f (t1), . . . , VM,f (tn)〉 ∈
I(P )}).
4. [[(∅, {v .= t})]]M := (∅, {f ∈MU | f(v) = VM,f (t)}).
5. [[(∅, {v 6= t})]]M := (∅, {f ∈MU | f(v) 6= VM,f (t)}).
6. [[−D]]M := −[[D]]M.
7. [[D ⊕D′]]M := [[D]]M ⊕ [[D′]]M.
Clearly, this provides an elegant and compositional model-theoretic seman-
tics for DRSs. Moreover, it is easily verified that Definition 13 is equivalent
to Definitions 9 and 10 in the sense that if [[D]]M = 〈X,F 〉, then for any
assignment s, s ∈ F iff s verifies D in M.
The semantics considered so far defines the truth conditions of DRSs. But as
we noted at the end of section 5, there is more to the meaning of a DRS than
truth conditions alone. For DRSs which define the same truth conditions
may still differ in their context change potentials.
To capture differences in context change potential, and not just in truth
conditions, we need a different kind of semantics, which makes use of a
more finely differentiated (and thus, necessarily, of a more complex) notion
of semantic value. There are several ways in which this can be achieved. The
one which we follow in the next definition defines the semantic value of a DRS
as a relation between assignments - between input assignments, which verify
the context to which the DRS is being evaluated, and output assignments,
which reflect the way in which the DRS modifies this context. A semantics
which characterizes the meaning of an expression in terms of its context
change potential is nowadays usually referred to as dynamic semantics, while
a semantics like that of the Definitions 2 and 3 or Definitions 9 and 10, whose
central concern is with conditions of truth, is called static. The first explicit
formulation of a dynamic semantics in this sense can be found in Barwise
[7]. An elegant formulation is given in Groenendijk & Stokhof [33].
Although they are quite different from a conceptual point of view, the
dynamic and the static semantics for formalisms like those of DRT are
24
nonetheless closely connected. Thus, if we denote the dynamic value of
DRS D in model M,—i.e., the relation between assignments of M which
D determines—as s[[D]]Ms′ , with s the input assignment and s
′ the output
assignment, we have:
• If D = (X,C) then: s[[D]]Ms′ iff s[X]s′ and s′ verifies D in M.
We can also characterize this relation directly, by a definition that is com-
positional in a similar spirit as Definition 13 in that it characterizes the
dynamic value of a complex DRS in terms of the dynamic values of its con-
stituents. It will be convenient to base this definition on a slightly different
syntactic characterization of the DRS formalism than we have used hith-
erto, one in which the symmetric merge of Definition 13 is replaced by an
asymmetric merge  defined as follows:
• If D = (X,C) and D′ = (Y,C ′) then DD′ := (X,C ∪C ′) is a DRS.
It is clear that all DRSs can be built from atomic DRSs using − and  (but
note that  disregards the universe of its second argument).
The dynamic semantics is given as follows. We use s[[D]]Ms′ for s, s
′ is an
input/output state pair for D in model M, and s[v]s′ for: s and s′ differ at
most in the value for v.
Definition 14
1. s[[({v}, ∅)]]Ms′ iff s[v]s′.
2. s[[(∅, {>})]]Ms′ iff s = s′.
3. s[[(∅, {Pt1, . . . , tn})]]Ms′ iff s = s′ and 〈VM,s(t1), . . . , VM,s(tn)〉 ∈ I(P ).
4. s[[(∅, {v .= t})]]Ms′ iff s = s′ and s(v) = VM,s(t).
5. s[[(∅, {v 6= t})]]Ms′′ iff s = s′ and s(v) 6= VM,s(t).
6. s[[−D]]Ms′ iff s = s′ and for no s′′ it is the case that s[[D]]Ms′′ .
7. s[[D D′]]Ms′ iff s[[D]]Ms′ and s′ [[D′]]Ms′ .
The static and the dynamic semantics of DRSs are equivalent, for we have
the following proposition:
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Proposition 15 [[D]]M = 〈X,F 〉, s[X]s′, s′ ∈ F iff s[[D]]Ms′ .
Still, the relation between static and dynamic semantics that we have given
here leaves something to be desired. The composition operations for static
semantics and dynamic semantics are different. The basic reason for this is
that the dynamic semantics has a notion of sequentiality built in, a notion of
processing in a given order. Therefore the commutative merge operation ⊕
does not quite fit the dynamic semantics: ⊕ is commutative, and sequential
merging of DRSs intuitively is not. The operation  is not commutative,
but it is unsatisfactory because it discards the dynamic effect of the second
DRS (which is treated as if it had an empty universe).
To give a true account of the context change potential of DRSs one has to
be able to answer the question how the context change potential of a DRS
D1 and that of a DRS D2 which follows it determine the context change
potential of their composition. This leads directly to the question how DRSs
can be built from constituent DRSs by an operation of sequential merging.
7 Sequential Composition of Representation Struc-
tures
Taking unions of universes and constraint sets is a natural commutative
merge operation on DRSs, but it is not quite the operation on DRS mean-
ings one would expect, given the dynamic perspective on DRS semantics.
Intuitively, the process of gluing an existing DRS representing the previous
discourse to a DRS representation for the next piece of natural language text
is a process of sequential composition, a process which one would expect not
to be commutative.
How should DRS meanings be composed sequentially? Before we address
this question, it is convenient to switch to a slightly modified language for
DRSs. It turns out that if one introduces a sequencing operator ; the dis-
tinction between DRSs and conditions can be dropped. This move yields the
following language that we will call the language of proto-DRSs or pDRSs.
pDRSs D ::= v | > | Pt1 · · · tn | v .= t | ¬D | (D1;D2).
In this language, a reference marker taken by itself is an atomic pDRS, and
pDRSs are composed by means of ;. Thus, introductions of markers and
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conditions can be freely mixed. Although we drop the distinction between
markers and conditions and that between conditions and pDRSs, a pDRS
of the form v will still be called a marker, and one of the form >, Pt1 · · · tn,
v
.= t or ¬D a condition. Thus, a pDRS is a reference marker or an atomic
condition or a negation or a ;-composition of pDRSs.
From now on, we will consider v 6= t as an abbreviation of ¬v .= t, and
D1 ⇒ D2 as an abbreviation of ¬(D1;¬D2). It will turn out that the process
of merging pDRSs with ‘;’ is associative, so we will often drop parentheses
where it does no harm, and write D1;D2;D3 for both ((D1;D2);D3) and
(D1; (D2;D3)).
It is possible to give a commutative semantics for pDRSs, by using the
semantic operation − to interpret ¬,and ⊕ to interpret ;.
Definition 16 (Commutative Semantics of pDRSs)
1. [[v]]M := 〈{v},MU 〉.
2. [[>]]M := 〈∅,MU 〉.
3. [[Pt1, . . . , tn]]M := 〈∅, {f ∈MU | 〈VM,f (t1), . . . , VM,f (tn)〉 ∈ I(P )}〉.
4. [[v .= t]]M := 〈∅, {f ∈MU | f(v) = VM,f (t)}〉.
5. [[¬D]]M := −[[D]]M.
6. [[D;D′]]M := [[D]]M ⊕ [[D′]]M.
This interpretation of ; makes merging of pDRSs into a commutative op-
eration. To see the effect of this, look for instance at examples (33) and
(34).
(33) A man entered.
(34) A boy smiled.
How should pDRSs for these examples be merged? The commutative merge
that we just defined gives the result (35).
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(35)
x
man x
enter x
;
x
boy x
smile x
=
x
man x
enter x
boy x
smile x
In the pDRT semantics the two discourse referents for a man and a a boy
will be fused, for according to the operation ⊕ the fact that a marker is
mentioned more than once is irrelevant. This shows that (35) cannot be the
right translation of the sequential composition of (33) and (34).
A different approach to merging pDRSs is suggested by the fact that in
a dynamic perspective merging in left to right order has a very natural
relational meaning:
• s[[D1;D2]]Ms′ iff there is an assignment s′′ with s[[D1]]Ms′′ and s′′ [[D2]]Ms′ .
This semantic clause complies with the intuition that the first pDRS is
interpreted in an initial context s yielding a new context s′′, and this new
context serves as the initial context for the interpretation of the second
pDRS.
Once we are here a natural way to extend the dynamic approach to the
full language suggests itself, as was noted by Groenendijk and Stokhof in
[33]. Their observation is basically this. If we interpret the DRS condi-
tions in terms of pairs of assignments, the dynamic semantic values of DRS
conditions can be given in the same form as the dynamic values of DRSs.
At first sight, DRS conditions do not look like context changers. If (s, s′)
is a context pair for a condition, then always s = s′, representing the fact
that the condition does not change anything. But who cares? If we allow
degenerate context changers, we can drop the distinction between conditions
and DRSs altogether. What is more, even the distinction between marker
introductions and conditions is not essential, for the introduction of a marker
u can also be interpreted in terms of context pairs, and the introduction
of a list of markers can be obtained by merging the introductions of the
components.
These considerations yield the following relational semantics for the pDRS
format (this is in fact the semantic format of the dynamic version of first
order predicate logic defined in Groenendijk and Stokhof [33]):
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Definition 17 (Relational Semantics of pDRSs)
1. s[[v]]Ms′ iff s[v]s
′.
2. s[[>]]Ms′ iff s = s′.
3. s[[Pt1, . . . , tn]]Ms′ iff s = s
′ and 〈VM,s(t1), . . . , VM,s(tn)〉 ∈ I(P ).
4. s[[v
.= t]]Ms′ iff s = s
′ and s(v) = VM,s(t).
5. s[[¬D]]Ms′ iff s = s′ and for no s′′ it is the case that s[[D]]Ms′′ .
6. s[[D;D′]]Ms′ iff there is an s
′′ with s[[D]]Ms′′ and s′′ [[D
′]]Ms′ .
Truth is defined in terms of this, as follows.
Definition 18 (Truth in relational semantics for pDRSs) D is true
in M, given s, notation M, s |= D, iff there is an s′ with s[[D]]Ms′ .
Note that the difference with the previous semantics (definition 16) resides
in the interpretation of ; and has nothing to do with with the static/dynamic
opposition. To see that, observe that the relational semantics definition 17
can also be given a static formulation. For that, the only change one has
to make to definition 16 is in the clause for D1;D2, by interpreting ; as the
operation ◦ defined as follows:
〈X,F 〉 ◦ 〈X ′, F ′〉 := 〈X ∪X ′, {f ′ ∈ F ′ | ∃f ∈ F f [X ′]f ′}〉
Given this change to definition 16, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 19 M, s |= D iff [[D]] = 〈X,F 〉 and ∃f ∈ F with s[X]f .
So we see that 17 can be given an equivalent static formulation. Conversely,
it is not hard to give a relational clause for ⊕:
fR⊕ Sg ⇐⇒ f [R• ∪ S•]g & g ∈ rng (R) ∩ rng (S),
where R• = {v ∈ U | (f, g) ∈ R & f(v) 6= g(v)} (and similarly for S•).
According to the relational semantics of Definition 17, (36) and (37) have
the same meanings.
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(36) x; y; man x; woman y; love (x,y).
(37) x; man x; y; woman y; love (x,y).
This means that we can use the same box representation (38) for both:
(38)
x y
man x
woman y
love (x,y)
Unfortunately, other examples show that the box notation does not really
fit the relational semantics for the pDRSs given in definition 17. The use of
collecting discourse referents in universes, as it is done in the box format,
is that this allows one to see the anaphoric possibilities of a representation
at a glance: the discourse referents in the top box are the markers available
for subsequent anaphoric linking.
However, when the composition operation ; is interpreted as in Definition 17
(or, alternatively, as the operation ◦), the pDRS notation becomes capable
of expressing distinctions that cannot be captured in the box notation we
have been using. Note, for instance that the pDRSs in (39) and (40) are not
equivalent with regard to the semantics of Definition 17, although they are
equivalent with regard to that given by (the unmodified) Definitions 9 and
10.
(39) x; man x; dog y; y; woman y; love (x,y).
(40) x; y; man x; dog y; woman y; love (x,y).
To take this difference into account the box representation for (39) would
have to be something like (41).
(41)
x y
man x woman y
dog y love (x,y)
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The vertical dividing line in (41) separates the occurrences of y that receive
their interpretation from the previously given context from those that are
linked to the new introduction.
Thus we see that the relational semantics for pDRSs provides a natural no-
tion of sequential merging, which allows sharing of introduced markers be-
tween two DRSs. However, it distinguishes between different introductions
of the same marker. This introduces a problem of destructive assignment :
after a new introduction of a marker v that was already present, its pre-
vious value is lost. This feature of definition 17 is the root cause of the
mismatch between box representation and sequential presentation that we
just noted. It is also the source of the non-equivalence of the commutative
and the relational composition semantics for the pDRS format.
For a fruitful discussion of the problem of sequential merge, it is necessary
to be clear about the nature of the different kinds of marker occurrences in
a pDRS. In the following discussion we compare the role of reference mark-
ers with that of variables in classical logic and in programming languages.
Classical logic has two kinds of variable occurrences: bound and free. In
the dynamic logic that underlies DRT there are three kinds of variable or
marker occurrences (see Visser [70]).
1. marker occurrences that get their reference fixed by the larger context,
2. marker occurrences that get introduced in the current context,
3. markers occurrences that get introduced in a subordinate context.
We will call the first kind fixed marker occurrences, the second kind in-
troduced marker occurrences, and the third kind classically bound marker
occurrences. The first kind corresponds roughly to the free variable occur-
rences of classical logic, and the third kind to the bound variable occurrences
of classical logic (hence the name). The second kind is altogether different:
these are the markers that embody the context change potential of a given
pDRS.
As the distinction between these three kinds of marker occurrences is given
by ‘dynamic’ considerations, it is not surprising that there is a close connec-
tion with the various roles that variables can play in imperative program-
ming. Here are the correspondences:
1. Fixed markers correspond to variables in read memory.
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2. Introduced markers correspond to variables in write memory.
3. Bound markers correspond to scratch memory (memory used for inter-
mediate computations that are not part of the output of the program
under consideration).
Due to the semantic motivation for this tripartite distinction, the formal
definition will depend on the semantics for ; that we adopt. We will give the
definition based on the relational semantics.
The set of discourse referents which have a fixed occurrence in a pDRS is
given by a function fix : pDRSs→ PU . The set of discourse referents which
are introduced in a pDRS is given by a function intro : pDRSs → PU , and
the set of discourse referents which have a classically bound occurrence in a
pDRS is given by a function cbnd : pDRSs→ PU . To define these functions,
we first define a function var on the atomic conditions of a DRS.
var(Pt1 · · · tn) := {ti | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ti ∈ U}
var(v .= t) :=
{ {v, t} if t ∈ U,
{v} otherwise.
Definition 20 (fix, intro, cbnd)
• fix(v) := ∅, intro(v) := {v}, cbnd(v) := ∅.
• fix(>) := ∅, intro(>) := ∅, cbnd(>) := ∅.
• fix(Pt1 · · · tn) := var(Pt1 · · · tn), intro(Pt1 · · · tn) := ∅, cbnd(Pt1 · · · tn) :=
∅.
• fix(v .= t) := var(v .= t), intro(v .= t) := ∅, cbnd(v .= t) := ∅.
• fix(¬D) := fix(D), intro(¬D) := ∅, cbnd(¬D) := intro(D) ∪ cbnd(D).
• fix(D1;D2) := fix(D1) ∪ (fix(D2)− intro(D1)),
intro(D1;D2) := intro(D1) ∪ intro(D2),
cbnd(D1;D2) := cbnd(D1) ∪ cbnd(D2).
We will occasionally use activ(D) for the set of markers fix(D) ∪ intro(D).
The set of conditions of a pDRS is given by the function cond : pDRSs →
P(pDRSs), which collects the conditions of D together in a set:
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Definition 21 (cond)
1. cond(v) := ∅.
2. cond(>) := {>}.
3. cond(Pt1 · · · tn) := {Pt1 · · · tn}.
4. cond(v .= t) := {v .= t}.
5. cond(¬D) := {¬D}.
6. cond(D1;D2) := cond(D1) ∪ cond(D2).
Note that there are pDRSs D with intro(D) ∩ fix(D) 6= ∅. An example is
given in (42).
(42) Px;x;Qx.
Also, there are pDRSs D where a marker is introduced more than once. An
example is given in (43).
(43) x;Px;x;Qx
We will call a pDRS proper (or a DRS) if these situations do not occur.
Thus, the set of DRSs is defined as follows:
Definition 22 (DRSs)
• If v is a marker, then v is a DRS.
• > is a DRS.
• If t1, . . . , tn are terms and P is an n-place predicate letter, then Pt1 · · · tn
is a DRS.
• If v is a marker and t is a term, then v .= t is a DRS.
• If D is a DRS, then ¬D is a DRS.
• If D1, D2 are DRSs, and (fix(D1) ∪ intro(D1)) ∩ intro(D2) = ∅, then
D1;D2 is a DRS.
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• Nothing else is a DRS.
Note that examples (42) and (43) are not DRSs. Indeed, we have:
Proposition 23 For every DRS D, intro(D) ∩ fix(D) = ∅.
Proposition 23 entails that DRSs of the form D; v are equivalent to v;D.
This means that any DRS D can be written in box format (44) without
change of meaning. Indeed, we can view the box format for DRSs as an
abstract version of the underlying real syntax.
(44)
intro(D)
cond(D)
Note that if a DRS D has intro(D) 6= ∅ and cond(D) 6= ∅, then D must
be of the form D1;D2, where (fix(D1) ∪ intro(D1)) ∩ intro(D2) = ∅. We say
that D is a simple merge of D1 and D2.
According to the DRS definition, DRSs are either of one of the forms in (45)
or they are simple merges of two DRSs (but note that taking simple merges
is a partial operation).
(45)
v
> Pt1 · · · tn v .= t ¬D
For DRSs, the truth conditions according to the commutative semantics
coincide with those according to the relational semantics:
Proposition 24 For all models M, all DRSs D:
if [[D]]M = 〈X,F 〉 then s[[D]]Ms′ iff s[X]s′ and s′ ∈ F
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8 Strategies for Merging Representation Structures
To get a clear perspective on the problem of merging DRSs, note that the
issue does not even occur in an approach where a natural language discourse
is processed by means of a DRS construction algorithm that proceeds by
‘deconstructing’ natural language sentences in the context of a given DRS,
as in Kamp [37] or Kamp and Reyle [38].
The problem emerges as soon as one modifies this architecture by switching
to a set-up where representations for individual sentences are constructed
first, and next these have to be merged in left to right order. Suppose we
want to construct a DRS for the sequential composition of S1 and S2 on
the basis of a DRS D1 for S1 and a DRS D2 for S2. Now it might happen
that D1;D2 is not a DRS, because (fix(D1) ∪ intro(D1)) ∩ intro(D2) 6= ∅.
Our idea is to resolve this situation by applying a renaming strategy. In the
example sentences given so far the problem has been avoided by a prudent
choice of indices, but example (46) would pose such a conflict.
(46) A man1 entered. A boy1 smiled.
The initial representation for the sequential composition of D1 and D2 can
be given by D1 •D2. The problem of sequential merge now takes the form
of finding strategies for reducing DRS-like expressions with occurrences of
• to DRSs.
Before we list of a number of options for ‘merge reduction’, we define a class
of reducible DRSs or RDRSs (assume D ranges over DRSs):
RDRSs R ::= D | ¬R | (R1 •R2).
Thus, RDRSs are compositions out of DRSs by means of ¬ and •. It is
useful to extend the definitions of intro, fix and cbnd to RDRSs:
Definition 25 (fix, intro, cbnd for RDRSs)
• fix(¬R) := fix(R), intro(¬R) := ∅, cbnd(¬R) := intro(R) ∪ cbnd(R).
• fix(R1 •R2) := fix(R1) ∪ (fix(R2)− intro(R1)),
intro(R1 •R2) := intro(R1) ∪ intro(R2),
cbnd(R1 •R2) := cbnd(R1) ∪ cbnd(R2).
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We use • for sequential merge. The various options for how to merge DRSs
all have a semantic and a syntactic side, for they must handle two questions:
1. What is the semantics of •?
2. How can RDRSs be reduced to DRSs?
In order to talk about these reductions in a sensible way, we must take
negative context into account. Here is a definition of negative contexts (D
ranges over DRSs, R over RDRSs).
Negative Contexts N ::= ¬2 | ¬N | (N ;D) | (D;N) | (N •R) | (R •N).
Condition on (N ;D): activ(N) ∩ intro(D) = ∅. Condition on (D;N):
activ(D) ∩ intro(N) = ∅, where activ(N) and intro(N) are calculated on
the basis of intro(2) := fix(2) := cbnd(2) := ∅.
What the definition says is that a negative context is an RDRS with one
constituent RDRS immediately within the scope of a negation replaced by
2. If N is a negative context, then N [R] is the result of substituting RDRS
R for 2 in N . The definition of negative contexts allows us to single out an
arbitrary negated sub-RDRS R of a given RDRS by writing that RDRS in
the form N [R].
Contexts C ::= 2 | N .
A context is either a 2 or a negative context. If C is a context, then C[R]
is the result of substituting RDRS R for 2 in N . Thus, if we want to say
that a reduction rule applies to an RDRS R that may (but need not) occur
immediately within the scope of a negation sign within a larger RDRS, we
say that the rule applies to C[R]. If we specify a reduction rule
R =⇒ R′,
this is meant to be understood as licensing all reductions of the form:
C[R] −→ C[R′].
This format ensures that the rule can both apply at the top level and at a
level bounded by a negation sign inside a larger RDRS.
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We will now discuss several options for merge reduction: symmetric merge,
prudent merge, destructive merge, deterministic merge with substitution,
and indeterministic merge with substitution.
Symmetric Merge Interpret • as ⊕ and ; as ◦. The reduction rules that
go with this are:
(R • v) =⇒ (v;R)
(R • >) =⇒ (R;>)
(R • Pt1, . . . , tn) =⇒ (R;Pt1, . . . , tn)
(R • ¬R′) =⇒ (R;¬R′)
((R • v) •R′) =⇒ ((v;R) •R′)
((R • >) •R′) =⇒ ((R;>) •R′)
((R • Pt1, . . . , tn) •R′) =⇒ ((R;Pt1, . . . , tn) •R′)
((R • ¬R1) •R2) =⇒ ((R;¬R′) •R2)
(R • (R1;R2)) =⇒ ((R •R1) •R2)
(R • (R1 •R2)) =⇒ ((R •R1) •R2)
Partial Merge Interpret • as a partial operation (see e.g. Muskens [50])
while retaining ◦ as the interpretation of ; (as we will do throughout the
remainder of this section). To give the semantics, we have to take context
into account. Assume that the semantics of a DRS D is given as a triple
〈X,Y, F 〉, where X = fix(D), Y = intro(D) and F is a set of assignments,
then the following partial operation gives the semantics of partial merge:
〈X,Y, F 〉〈X ′, Y ′, F ′〉 :=
{ 〈X ∪X ′, Y ∪ Y ′, F ∩ F ′〉 if (X ∪ Y ) ∩ Y ′ = ∅,
↑ otherwise.
The reduction rules that go with this: same as above, except for the following
change in the rules that handle marker introductions:
(R • v) =⇒ (R; v) if v /∈ fix(R) ∪ intro(R)
(R • v) =⇒ ERROR if v ∈ fix(R) ∪ intro(R)
((R • v) •R′) =⇒ ((R; v) •R′) if v /∈ fix(R) ∪ intro(R)
((R • v) •R′) =⇒ ERROR if v ∈ fix(R) ∪ intro(R).
Prudent Merge To give the semantics of prudent merging for • (see Visser
[70]), one again has to take context fully into account.
〈X,Y, F 〉  〈X ′, Y ′, F ′〉 := 〈X ∪ (X ′ − Y ), Y ∪ (Y ′ −X), F ∩ F ′〉.
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Reduction rules that go with this: same as above, except for the following
change in the rules that handle marker introduction:
(R • v) =⇒ (R; v) if v /∈ fix(R) ∪ intro(R)
(R • v) =⇒ R if v ∈ fix(R) ∪ intro(R)
((R • v) •R′) =⇒ (R; v) •R′) if v /∈ fix(R) ∪ intro(R)
((R • v) •R′) =⇒ R •R′ if v ∈ fix(R) ∪ intro(R).
Destructive Merge Interpret • as ◦ (relational composition), and allow
destructive assignment. The reduction rule that goes with this is very simple:
replace all occurrences of • in one go by ;, and interpret ; as ◦. But of course,
this reduction does not yield DRSs but only proto-DRSs.
For the next two perspectives on merging DRSs, we need to develop a bit of
technique for handling substitution, or, more precisely, marker renamings.
Definition 26 A marker renaming is a function θ : U → U , such that its
domain Dom(θ) := {v ∈ U | v 6= θ(v)} is finite. If θ is a renaming with
Dom(θ) = {v1, . . . , vn}, then Rng(θ) := {θ(v1), . . . , θ(vn)}. A renaming θ
avoids a set X ⊆ U :⇔ Rng(θ) ∩X = ∅. If θ is a renaming, then θ−v :=
the renaming σ that is like θ but for the fact that σ(v) = v. If X ⊆ U
then θX := {θ(x) | x ∈ X}. A marker renaming θ is injective on X :⇔
|X| = |θX|.
We will refer to a renaming θ with domain {v1, . . . , vn} as [θ(v1)/v1, . . . , θ(vn)/vn].
Thus, [x/y] is the renaming θ with θ(u) = x if u = y and θ(u) = u otherwise.
This renaming is of course injective on {x}, but not on {x, y}. [x/y, x/z] is
a renaming which is not injective on {y, z}. [x/y, x/z]− z = [x/y].
A renaming of a subset of intro(D) intuitively has as its semantic effect
that the write memory of D gets shifted. Renaming in a dynamic system
like DRT works quite differently from variable substitution in classical logic,
because of the three kinds of marker occurrences that have to be taken into
account: fix, intro and cbnd. In particular, a renaming of intro(D) has to
satisfy the following requirements:
1. it should be injective on intro(D),
2. it should avoid fix(D),
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3. it should leave cbnd(D) untouched.
The first two of these requirements can be imposed globally. Requirement
(iii) should be part of the definition of the effects of renamings on (R)DRSs:
we will handle it by distinguishing between outer and inner renaming. For an
outer renaming of RDRS R with θ we employ θR, for an inner renaming θR.
Inner renaming is renaming within a context where marker introductions act
as classical binders, i.e., within the scope of an occurrence of ¬. For example,
if θ = [v/x,w/y], then:
θ(x;¬(y;Rxy)) = v;¬(y;Rvy).
A renaming θ induces functions from terms to terms as follows:
θ(t) :=
{
θ(v) if t = v with v ∈ U,
t if t ∈ C.
A renaming θ−v induces functions from terms to terms as follows:
θ−v(t) :=

θ(w) if t = w 6= v with w ∈ U,
v if t = v,
t if t ∈ C.
The induced renaming functions from (R)DRSs to (R)DRSs are given by:
θv := θ(v)
θ> := >
θ> := >
θ(Pt1 · · · tn) := Pθt1 · · · θtn
θ(Pt1 · · · tn) := Pθt1 · · · θtn
θ(v .= t) := θv .= θt
θ(v .= t) := θv .= θt
θ(¬R) := ¬θR
θ(¬R) := ¬θR
θ(v;R) := θv; θR
θ(v;R) := v; θ−vR
θ(C;R) := θC; θR, C ∈ {Pt1 · · · tn, v .= t,¬R′}
θ(C;R) := θC; θR, C ∈ {Pt1 · · · tn, v .= t,¬R′}
θ((R1;R2);R3) := θ(R1; (R2;R3))
θ((R1;R2);R3) := θ(R1; (R2;R3)),
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plus rules for • exactly like those for ;.
For the semantics, let us again assume that a meaning for DRS D is a triple
〈X,Y, F 〉, where X = fix(D), Y = intro(D), and F is the set of assignments
satisfying cond(D).
Definition 27 θ is a proper renaming for DRS D :⇔
1. Dom(θ) ⊆ intro(D),
2. θ is injective on intro(D),
3. Rng(θ) ∩ fix(D) = ∅.
Definition 28 If F ⊆MU , θF := {g ∈MU | g ◦ θ ∈ F}.
For example, if F = {f ∈MU | f(x) ∈ I(P )}, and θ = [y/x], then:
[y/x]F = {g ∈MU | g ◦ [y/x](x) ∈ I(P )} = {g ∈MU | g(y) ∈ I(P )}.
Proposition 29 If θ is a proper renaming for D and |D|M = 〈X,Y, F 〉
then |θD|M = 〈X, θY, θF 〉.
The upshot if this proposition is that a proper renaming only changes the
write memory of a DRS.
Deterministic Merge With Substitution The sequence semantics for
dynamic predicate logic defined in Vermeulen [67] can be used as a semantics
for a language of unreduced DRSs:
R ::= PUSH v | > | Pt1 · · · tn | v .= t | ¬R | (R1 •R2),
where v ranges over a set U of markers without indices. The meaning of
a variable introduction v in sequence semantics is: push a new value for v
on a stack of v values. Clearly, this prevents the destructive use of memory
that we saw in connection with definition 17. Suggestive notation for this:
PUSH v.
We can reduce expressions of this language to a language of proper DRSs
where the markers are taken from the set of indexed markers U ′ := {ui |
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u ∈ U, i > 0}. The corresponding merge reduction rules for this use fully
determined renamings, as follows.
First we do a global renaming, by replacing every occurrence of v ∈ U , except
those immediately preceded by a PUSH, by v1 ∈ U ′. Next, assume that we
are in a situation D • PUSH v • R, where D is a DRS (no occurrences of
PUSH in D, no occurrences of • in D). Then there are two cases to consider.
It may be that vj does not occur in fix(D) ∪ intro(D), for any index j. In
that case, rewrite as follows:
(D • PUSH v) •R =⇒ (D; v1);R.
It may also be that vj does occur in fix(D) ∪ intro(D), for some index j. In
that case, let i be sup({j ∈ IN | vj ∈ fix(D) ∪ intro(D)}), and rewrite as
follows:
(D • PUSH v) •R =⇒ (D; vi+1); [vi+1/vi]R.
The idea behind these instructions is that if vj does not occur in D, then
v1 can safely be introduced, and it will actively bind the occurrences of v1
which occur in open position on the right. If vj does occur in D, then the
present push should affect the v-variables with the highest index in open
position on the right. This is precisely what the renaming [vi+1/vi] effects.
Indeterministic Merge With Substitution Indeterministic merge does
involve a family θ of merge operations, where θ is a renaming that is
constrained by the two DRSs D1 and D2 to be merged, in the sense that θ is
proper for D2 and θ avoids the set intro(D1)∪fix(D1). If the interpretations
of D1 and D2 are given by 〈X1, Y1, F1〉 and 〈X2, Y2, F2〉, respectively, then
the interpretation of D1 •θ D2 is given by:
〈X1 ∪X2, Y1 ∪ θY2, F1 ∩ θF2〉.
If θ is constrained in the way stated above this is a proper DRS denotation.
The rules for indeterministic merge reduction use renamings, as follows (we
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use activ(R) for intro(R) ∪ fix(R)):
(R • v) =⇒

(R; v) if v /∈ activ(R),
(R;w) if v ∈ activ(R),
w /∈ activ(R)
(R • >) =⇒ (R;>)
(R • Pt1, . . . , tn) =⇒ (R;Pt1, . . . , tn)
(R • ¬R′) =⇒ (R;¬R′)
((R • v) •R′) =⇒

((R; v);R′) if v /∈ activ(R),
((R;w); [w/v]R′ if v ∈ activ(R),
w /∈ activ(R) ∪ activ(R′)
((R • >) •R′) =⇒ ((R;>) •R′)
((R • Pt1, . . . , tn) •R′) =⇒ ((R;Pt1, . . . , tn) •R′)
((R • ¬R1) •R2) =⇒ ((R;¬R1) •R2)
(R • (R1;R2)) =⇒ ((R •R1) •R2)
(R • (R1 •R2)) =⇒ ((R •R1) •R2)
Note that under the indeterministic merge regime, • does not get an indepen-
dent semantics, so one cannot talk about ‘the’ meaning of D •D′ anymore,
only about its meaning modulo renaming of intro(D′). One can still prove
that different reductions of R to normal form (i.e. to proper DRSs) are al-
ways write variants of one another, i.e., R→ D and R→ D′ together entail
that there is some proper renaming θ of D with θD = D′.
A set of RDRSs together with a set of merge reduction rules like the example
sets given above is a so-called abstract reduction system (Klop [45]), and
the theory of abstract reduction systems can fruitfully be applied to their
study (Van Eijck [19]). What all merge reduction rule sets above, with
the exception of destructive merge, have in common is that they start out
from reducible DRSs and produce proper DRSs as normal forms. They all
take into account that the merge operation • should not destroy anaphoric
links. Merge with substitution has as an additional feature that it preserves
anaphoric sockets, and that is what we will use in the sequel. For practical
reasons we opt for the indeterministic version, to avoid possible confusion
due to the appearance of a new kind of indices (indicating stack depth).
Each RDRS or DRS has a set of anaphoric plugs and a set of anaphoric sock-
ets. The plugs anchor the representation structure to previous discourse or
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to contextually given antecedents. In both reduced and unreduced RDRSs,
these plugs have fixed names, given by fix(R). The sockets are the anchor-
ing ground for the next bit of discourse. In unreduced RDRSs, the sockets
do not have fixed names yet, and they may not yet represent the full set
of anaphoric possibilities of the represented discourse. During the process
of merge reduction, the internal wiring of the representation structure gets
re-shuffled and some members of intro(R) may end up with a new name,
to make room for extra sockets. If D is a fully reduced DRS, however, the
sockets have fixed names, given by intro(D)∪fix(D), and this set of markers
represents the full set of anaphoric possibilities for subsequent discourse.
Here is a concrete example of how disjoint merging according to the inde-
terministic merge regime works:
(47)
x
man x
enter x
•
x
woman x
smile x
→
x
man x
enter x
; [y/x]
x
woman x
smile x
=
x y
man x
enter x
woman y
smile y
In DRT with indeterministic merge, introduced markers are always new, so
no information is ever destroyed, and merging of representations preserves
all anaphoric possibilities of the parts that are merged.
We now know what the basic building blocks of DRT are, namely structures
as given in (45), and what is the glue that puts them together, namely
the disjoint merge operation involving marker renaming. This concludes
the discussion of compositionality for DRSs. Quite a few philosophical and
technical questions concerning the natural notion of information ordering in
DRT remain. See Visser [69] for illumination on these matters.
9 Disjoint Merge and Memory Management
Reference markers are similar to variables, but differ from them in that
they are not bound by logical operators in the usual sense. In fact, refer-
ence markers behave more like variables in programming languages than like
variables in ordinary first order logic (Section 7 above).
Anaphoric links are created by linking new reference markers to available
ones. How does one discard references? By de-allocating storage space on
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popping out of a ‘subroutine’. The representation, in box format, for (3) is
given in (48).
(48)
x
man x
enter x
⇒
smile x
The semantic treatment of this uses a subroutine for checking if every way of
making a reference to a man who enters (where the reference is established
via marker x) makes the property given by the consequent of the clause
succeed. Next the storage space for x is de-allocated, which explains why
an anaphoric link to a man in subsequent discourse is ruled out, or at least
infelicitous (see example (49)).
(49) If a man1 enters, he1 smiles. ∗He1 is happy.
Thus we see that anaphoric linking is not subsumed under variable bind-
ing, or at least not under variable binding perceived in a standard fashion,
as in first order logic. The process is much more akin to variable binding
in programming, where storage space is created and discarded dynamically,
and where links to a variable remain possible until the space occupied by
the variable gets de-allocated to be used for something else, so that fur-
ther anaphoric links remain possible as long as the variable space for the
antecedent remains accessible.
Reference markers, as we have seen, are allocated pieces of storage space for
(representations of) things in the world. We can picture the building of a
representation structure as an interactive process, where we give instructions
to make memory reservations and to provide names for the allocated chunks
of memory, as in (50).
(50) new(Var)
The system responds by allocating a chunk of memory of the correct size
and by returning a name as value of Var, say u385, indicating that a piece
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of storage space is allocated and henceforth known under the name u385,
where 385 presumably is the offset from the beginning of the piece of memory
where the representation under construction is stored. Once storage space
has been allocated to a discourse referent, it is useful to know the scope of
the allocation. In DRT the scope of the introduction of a discourse referent
is closed off by the closest ¬ operator (or the closest ⇒ operator, in case ⇒
is taken as a primitive) that has that introduction in its scope.
Of course, this interactive picture is an inside picture of what happens during
the representation building process. We must also be able to look at the
situation from the outside, and answer the question what happens if we
assume that we have built and stored two representation structures D1, D2
in the memory of a computer, one after the other. Next, we want to store
them in memory simultaneously, i.e., to merge them, where the merging has
to preserve sequential order. This will in general involve changing the names
of those variables declared in the second representation that would otherwise
overwrite the area of memory already used by the first representation.
What if some very suspicious semanticist still has qualms about disjoint
merge because of the indeterminism of the operation? We then would have
to explain to him (or her) that the indeterminism is entirely natural, as
it reflects the fact that the renaming operation is nothing but the familiar
operation of copying variable values to a different (unused) part of memory
before combining two memory states (Figure 1). Disjoint merge is indeter-
+ =
Figure 1: Copying registers before merging memory states.
ministic simply because any way of copying part of memory to a safe new
45
location will do. This suggests that indeterminism is a strength rather than
a weakness of the disjoint merge.
The story of a reasonable definition of merge is a story of memory manage-
ment. Assuming we have an unlimited supply of memory available, we may
picture the data part of memory where the active markers of representation
structure D reside as an array a[0], . . . , a[i], . . ., where the a[i] are the cells
containing the referents (pointers to the individuals in the model under con-
sideration). Where exactly in absolute memory representation structure D
is stored is immaterial; we assume it is stored in relative memory, that is to
say, at some unknown offset m from the start of the data part of memory. If
the marker set activ(D) of structure D occupies k memory cells and is stored
at offset m from the beginning of data memory, then the active markers of
D range from a[m] to a[m+ k].
As soon as we are willing to keep track of where in relative memory the result
of merging representation structures D1 and D2 is going to reside, counting
from the offset where D1 is stored, a deterministic disjoint merge is readily
available, in terms of a particular renaming θ determined by the memory
locations. Now the story gets us down to the level of programming the bare
silicon of the discourse representation machine, so to speak. Assuming the
markers activ(D1) of D1 reside in memory at u[0], . . . , u[i] (where u[0] =
a[m], for some offset m), and the markers activ(D2) of D2 reside in some
scratch part of memory s[0], . . . , s[j], then D1 and D2 can be merged after
a renaming θ = [u[i+ 1]/s[0], . . . , u[i+ j + 1]/s[j]], and activ(D1; θD2) will
reside in memory at u[0], . . . , u[i+ j + 1].
But once again, such a detailed description of the implementation of merge is
really unnecessary. What we will need for the next section is the assumption
that for all R1, R2, the merge R1 •R2 is a well-defined (reducible) discourse
representation structure, and that the result of merging R1 and R2 is in-
dependent of the choice of marker names, in the sense that the operation
does not destroy anaphoric sockets due to variable name clashes. This is
precisely what we have got in the definition of the merge operation provided
by indeterministic merge. What it all boils down to is this. Anaphoric links
are essentially arrows pointing from anaphoric expressions to antecedents
(Figure 2). Often these links can be represented by indices, as in (51).
(51) Johni hates a manj who hates himi and another manj who does not.
The actual choice of the index numbers does not matter. What matters is
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John hates a man who hates him and another man who does not.
Figure 2: Anaphoric links are arrows.
the property of having the same index. In a slogan: anaphoric arrows are
index pairs (i i) modulo renamings. Of course, one might also assume that
all indices have been picked appropriately from the start, but as a general
strategy this would seem quite unrealistic; and in any case the point we want
to make here is that that assumption is not necessary.
v
data
Figure 3: Direct allocation of storage space to variable v.
While we are at the topic of memory management, we might as well mention
that there are at least two non-equivalent ways in which storage space for
reference markers can get allocated. In the first variant, which we have
assumed until now, on allocating memory and giving it a name v, v becomes
the name of the piece of memory containing the data (Figure 3).
v
data
Figure 4: Indirect allocation of storage space to variable v.
In the second variant, v refers to the data indirectly by pointing to a piece of
storage space containing the data. This second variant allows much greater
versatility in manipulating data structures. The name v might for instance
be used to allocate and point to a new piece of memory, without destroy-
ing previous data (Figure 5). Indirect allocation ensures that old data are
preserved in memory, although they may no longer be accessible under the
old name (Figure 5). The development of a pointer semantics for DRT
suggests the use of pointer stacks to keep track of referents that are contex-
tually salient, allowing pointers to be set to nil to indicate that a referent
has drifted out of focus, and so on. For a detailed account of a pointer
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vdata
Figure 5: Allocating new memory space to v without destroying old data.
semantics for a variant of DRT we refer the reader to Vermeulen [68].
10 Constructing DRSs for Natural Language Frag-
ments
As we have seen in Section 6, there is one sense in which the compositionality
of DRT is unproblematic: the representation formalisms DRT proposes are
as compositional as one could like. In fact, all semantic definitions we have
considered in the last three sections, from Definition 9, onwards, have been
essentially compositional: they either were, or else could readily be converted
into, compositional definitions of the semantic values that expressions of
these formalisms determine in a model. Moreover, in the last two sections we
have looked at a number of merge operations for putting two DRSs together
into a single one. These operations too, we found, can be given direct
semantic interpretations which map the semantic values of the component
DRSs into the semantic value of the compound.
But what about compositionality in the second sense? Does DRT provide
a way of analyzing fragments of natural language which assigns these frag-
ments a semantics that is compositional with respect to these fragments
themselves, a semantics that is compositional with respect to a natural syn-
tax for these fragments? The original formulation of DRT did not seem
to provide such an analysis, and it was even suggested at the time that a
compositional treatment of the natural language fragments then considered
would be impossible. In the meantime we have, through the dynamic re-
formulation of DRT discussed in Sections 7, 8 and 9, come to see that such
pessimism is not quite warranted: when applied judiciously, the traditional
computational methods familiar from Montague Grammar can be made to
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work so that they assign sentences and texts from these fragments the same
truth conditions as the original version of DRT. It suffices to define the
building blocks of DRSs as suitably typed expressions of a typed language.
In particular, each word of the natural language fragment in question can
be assigned an expression of the typed language as its lexical entry, and
these expressions can then be combined, by ‘semantic’ rules corresponding
to syntactic composition rules, into representations of any given sentence or
text of the fragment; by an entirely analogous process, one can compute the
semantic value of the sentence or text directly from the semantic values of
the (entries of) the words composing them.
Whether the compositional approach towards DRT, which operates under
much stricter constraints than the original DRT approach (e.g. Kamp &
Reyle [38]), can handle all the purposes to which DRT has been put is a
question to which there is at present no clear answer. We turn to this
question briefly at the end of this section and again in Section 12.
A DRS construction algorithm for a given natural language fragment has
to provide instructions for extending a given DRS with the information
contained in a sentence from the fragment. This entails that the processing
instructions for that sentence should take information from the previous
representation into account. In practice, this is the list of available referents.
Assuming that the representation of the previous discourse is in reduced
form, we may take it that we have a list u1, . . . , un available of reference
markers introduced by previous discourse. Pronouns may be resolved to any
member of this list, and also to markers that get introduced by antecedents
in the sentence under consideration.
The process of anaphoric resolution on the basis of available information
from the representation of previous discourse poses a highly non-trivial chal-
lenge, and it is questionable if a real algorithm for this process is on the cards.
The following problem is more manageable. Assuming that an anaphoric in-
dexing for a sentence is given, and also that a decision has been made about
the relative scopes of the operators (i.e., a reading of the sentence has been
fixed by the sentence grammar), give an algorithm for updating an available
representation structure with the information from that sentence. In fact,
as we shall see, we get a lot of this for free because of the presence of the
merge operation •.
To illustrate the process of constructing DRSs for natural language frag-
ments, we begin by defining a sentence grammar for a toy fragment. Basic
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category abbreviates
CN S/E(*,*,*)
VP(*) E(Nom,*,*)\S
NP(case,i,j) S/(E(case,i,j)\S)
TV(tense) VP(tense)/NP(Acc,*,*)
DET(i,j) NP(*,i,j)/CN
AUX VP(Tensed)/VP(Inf)
REL (CN\CN)/VP(Tensed)
Figure 6: Category abbreviations for a toy grammar.
S
NP(*,i,j)
DET(i,j) CN
CN
CN\CN
REL VP(Tensed)
VP(Tensed)
AUX VP(Inf)
TV(Inf) NP(Acc,*,*)
Figure 7: Example of a possible sentence structure according to the toy
grammar.
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categories are S (without features) for sentences, TXT (without features) for
texts, and E (with features for case, antecedent index i, anaphoric index j),
for markers for individual entities. We assume the category abbreviations
given in Figure 6. Here the feature variable tense ranges over the values
Tensed and Inf, the feature variable case ranges over the values Nom and
Acc, and the index features range over the positive natural numbers. The
example structure generated by this grammar given in Figure 7 illustrates
how the grammar works. Further information about the categorial format
with feature unification is provided in the Chapters on Categorial Grammar
and on Feature Structures in this Handbook.
expression category translates to type
ai DET(i,*) λPλQ(ui • P (ui) •Q(ui)) ((e,T),((e,T),T))
everyi DET(i,*) λPλQ¬((ui • P (ui)) • ¬Q(ui)) ((e,T),((e,T),T))
noi DET(i,*) λPλQ¬((ui • P (ui)) •Q(ui)) ((e,T),((e,T),T))
anotherij DET(i,j) λPλQ(ui;ui 6= uj • P (ui) •Q(ui)) ((e,T),((e,T),T))
theij DET(i,j) λPλQ(ui;ui
.
= uj • P (ui) •Q(ui)) ((e,T),((e,T),T))
hisij DET(i,j) λPλQ(ui; poss (uj , ui) • P (ui) •Q(ui)) ((e,T),((e,T),T))
Billi NP(*,*,i) λP (ui
.
= b • P (ui)) ((e,T),T)
who REL λPλQλv(Q(v) • P (v)) ((e,T),((e,T),(e,T)))
hei NP(nom,*,i) λP (P (ui)) ((e,T),T)
himi NP(acc,*,i) λP (P (ui)) ((e,T),T)
man CN λv(man (v)) (e,T)
boy CN λv(boy (v)) (e,T)
smiles VP(Tensed) λv(smile (v)) (e,T)
smile VP(Inf) λv(smile (v)) (e,T)
has TV(Tensed) λPλu(Pλv(poss (u, v))) (((e,T),T),(e,T))
have TV(Inf) λPλu(Pλv(poss (u, v))) (((e,T),T),(e,T))
hates TV(Tensed) λPλu(Pλv(hate (u, v))) (((e,T),T),(e,T))
hate TV(Inf) λPλu(Pλv(hate (u, v))) (((e,T),T),(e,T))
does not AUX λPλv¬P (v)) ((e,T),(e,T))
if (S/S)/S λpλq(¬(p • ¬q)) (T,(T,T))
. S\(TXT/S) λpλq(p • q) (T,(T,T))
. TXT\(TXT/S) λpλq(p • q) (T,(T,T))
Figure 8: Lexical component of the toy fragment for English.
If we start out with basic types e for entities and T for state transitions (not
truth values!), then the table given in Figure 8 defines the lexical component
of a tiny fragment of English. Variables u, v range over type e, variables p, q
over type T , variables P,Q over type (e, T ), variables P over type ((e, T ), T ).
We distinguish between variables of the typed logic and reference markers
(i.e. variables of the dynamic representation). Markers ui are taken from a
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set U which we assume to be disjoint from the set Ve of variables of type e.
Thus, from the perspective of the typed logic the reference markers behave
like constants. A rather straightforward definition of the interpretation of
a typed expression can now be given in terms of an interpretation function
I, a (typed logic) variable assignment g, and a marker assignment f . This
theme is played (sometimes with minor variations) in Asher [4], Bos et al.
[12], Kuschert [47] and Muskens [50].
From the point of view of the dynamic logic reference markers are variables,
to be sure, but, as we have seen, substitution for dynamic variables is han-
dled quite differently from variable substitution in static logics. Another
way of expressing the relation between typed variables and reference mark-
ers is by saying that β reduction (which affects typed variables) and merge
reduction (which affects markers) are orthogonal: there is no interaction
between the λ reduction rules and the • reduction rules.
The category table in the lexicon makes clear that example sentence (52)
has the structure specified in Figure 7.
(52) The man who smiles does not hate Bill.
Some other sentences in the fragment are given in (53) and (54) (we use
the particular nouns and verbs in the table as paradigms, of course).
(53) If a man hates Bill, he does not smile.
(54) If a bishop meets another bishop, he blesses him.
For convenience, we have assumed that the connective ‘.’ serves as a dis-
course constructor. Example (55) gives a text which is in the fragment.
(55) The man who smiles does not hate Bill. He respects Bill.
Note that • is used for merging of structures in all those cases where renam-
ing may still be necessary. The translations of if and every use ¬(p • ¬q)
rather than p⇒ q to allow for the possibility of renaming during the merge
of the components.
The composition of representation structures for these example sentences is
a matter of routine. See Gamut [30] for a didactic account of the general pro-
cedure, Asher [4] and Muskens [50] for applications in dynamic semantics,
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and Bouchez, Van Eijck and Istace [13] for a description of an implementa-
tion of dynamic semantics using the technique.
As an example, let us go through the procedure of building a representa-
tion for (55). We assume the following indexing to indicate the intended
anaphoric link.
(56) The [man who smiles]1 does not hate Bill. He1 respects Bill.
We also have to choose anaphoric indices for the man who smiles and Bill.
Assume these to be 2 and 3, respectively. In the table we find transla-
tion λPλQλv(Q(v)•P (v)) for who, while smiles translates as λv(smile (v)).
These combine by functional application, which gives (57) (after renaming
of variables for perspicuity).
(57) λQλv(Q(v) • λw(smile (w))(v)).
Expression (57) β reduces to (58).
(58) λQλv(Q(v) • smile (v)).
Combining (58) with the translation of man, we get (59).
(59) λv(λw(man (w))(v) • smile (v)).
Expression (59) β reduces to (60).
(60) λv(man (v) • smile (v)).
Combining (60) with the translation of the12 gives expression (61) as trans-
lation for the12 man who smiles:
(61) λQ(u1;u1
.= u2 • λw(man (w) • smile (w))(u1) •Q(u1)).
Applying β reduction to expression (61) gives (62).
(62) λQ(u1;u1
.= u2 •man (u1) • smile (u1) •Q(u1)).
In a similar way, we get (63) for does not hate Bill33.
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(63) λu¬(u3 .= b • hate (u, u3)).
Combining (62) and (63) gives the translation of the first sentence of (56):
(64) (u1;u1
.= u2 •man (u1) • smile (u1);¬(u3 .= b • hate (u1, u3))).
Merge reduction of (64) (with the identical renaming) gives:
(65) (u1;u1
.= u2; man (u1); smile (u1);¬(u3 .= b; hate (u1, u3))).
In box format:
(66)
u1
u1
.= u2
man u1
smile u1
¬ u3 .= b
hate (u1, u3)
The translation of the second sentence of (56) is (67).
(67) (u3
.= b • respect (u1, u3)).
One merge reduction step, with identical renaming:
(68) (u3
.= b; respect (u1, u3)).
The translation of discourse (56) is the result of applying the semantic
operation for text composition (the semantics for ‘.’ in the lexicon table) to
(65) and (67), in that order:
(69) λpλq(p•q))(u1;u1 .= u2; man (u1); smile (u1);¬(u3 .= b; hate (u1, u3)))
(u3
.= b; respect (u1, u3)).
Two β reductions and one further merge reduction with identical renaming
gives the following result (in box format):
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(70)
u1
u1
.= u2
man u1
smile u1
¬ u3 .= b
hate (u1, u3)
u3
.= b
respect (u1, u3)
The fact that no new discourse referent gets introduced for the proper name
Bill is a reflection of our treatment of proper names. Here is the entry for
proper names in the lexicon table again:
expression category translates to type
Billi NP(*,*,i) λP (ui
.= b • P (ui)) ((e,T),T)
Here i is the index that links the constant b for the proper name to its
external anchor. Anaphoric links involving proper names are insensitive to
where the name gets introduced, for they are interpreted as links where
the anaphor and the proper name are both anaphoric expressions with a
common ‘externally given’ antecedent.
At this point a couple of remarks are in order about the rules of index as-
signment which are part of our present treatment. The first remark concerns
the lower indices, which, we have been assuming, must be assigned not only
to pronouns but in fact to definite noun phrases of any kind. The require-
ment that every definite NP must receive a lower index reflects the so-called
familiarity principle (see Heim [35]), according to which a definite NP is
used felicitously only when the utterance context already contains a refer-
ence marker for its referent, which can then serve as ‘anaphoric antecedent’
for the NP. It is doubtful that the familiarity principle can be upheld in as
rigid and comprehensive a form as this, in which it is taken to apply to every
occurrence of every type of definite noun phrase. The definite description
the man who smiles in (52) is a case in point. It would certainly be possi-
ble to use this phrase for picking out from a given crowd the unique person
smiling, pretty much as many philosophers, from Frege and Russell onwards,
have been claiming about definite descriptions. Such a use could easily occur
in a context in which no reference marker for the smiling man had as yet
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TXT
TXT/S
TXT
TXT/S
S .
S
.
S
Figure 9: The structure of a three sentence text in our grammar set-up.
been introduced. A treatment of definite descriptions which insists on the
presence of antecedent reference markers for definites could still be saved by
assuming that definite descriptions always come with a presupposition that
the context contains such a reference marker, but that this presupposition
can be easily accommodated when necessary. One may have one’s doubts
about the plausibility of this rescue strategy. But even if we go along with
it, we will have to reformulate our semantics in such a way that it allows for
such accommodations, and allows them to be made at those points where
human interpreters would have to make them. In other words, the theory
will have to be restated so that it can deal with aspects of presupposition.
Unfortunately, this is a matter that we cannot go into for reasons of space.
For the treatment of presupposition within DRT, see the bibliographical
remarks in section E.
A similar remark is in order about the lower indices of proper names such as
John. Does the use of a proper name presuppose that its referent is already
represented in the given context? Perhaps, but if so, then ‘context’ needs to
be construed in a quite liberal way. So, before such a treatment of proper
names can be considered satisfactory, much more needs to be said about
how the notion of context is to be construed—what kinds of information
may contexts include, from what kinds of contexts can their information
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come, etc.
The second remark concerns the implicit assumption that the texts to which
our theory is applied come fully equipped with all the necessary upper and
lower indices and that all of these have been assigned in advance. One way
in which this assumption gets us into difficulties shows up in the text (71),
which has the structure indicated in Figure 9.
(71) A man1 who mistrusted the assistant23 walked in. He1 asked for the
manager24. He2 turned out to be on holiday.
As the text structure indicates, first representations are built for the first
two sentences and these are merged together, and only then is a representa-
tion for the third sentence merged with the representation of the preceding
discourse. Note that in this case the merge of the representations of the first
and the second sentence would involve a renaming of the discourse referent
for the manager, to avoid a clash with the marker for the assistant from the
first sentence. This means that the anaphoric index 2 in the third sentence is
not going to pick up a reference to the manager anymore, as was presumably
intended.
The example points towards an aspect of DRT that deserves comment.
DRT—this is as true of the form in which it was originally stated as it
is of the dynamic formulation presented here—is not a theory of anaphora
resolution: the theory itself tells us little about how to select the intended
antecedent for a given anaphoric expression from among a number of pos-
sible candidates. The only substantive contribution which classical DRT
makes to the problem of anaphora resolution consists in what it has to say
about the ‘accessibility’ of reference markers that have been introduced in
one part of a text to anaphoric expressions occurring elsewhere (see e.g.
Kamp & Reyle [38], Ch. 1.4); but this is only a small part of a compre-
hensive account of anaphora resolution capable of predicting the intended
anaphoric connections in all cases in which these are evident to a human
interpreter.
Arguably this is as it should be. It would be unreasonable to demand of a
theory of linguistic semantics—and it is that which DRT originally aimed
at—that it incorporate a detailed account of anaphora resolution, which
would have to rely on a host of pragmatic principles as well as on an indefinite
amount of world knowledge.
It seems not unreasonable, however, to demand of such a theory that it offer a
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suitable interface to other (pragmatic and/or extra-linguistic) components of
a comprehensive theory of meaning which are designed to deal with anaphora
resolution (see Sidner [63], Webber [73], and Chapter 10 of Alshawi c.s. [2])
and to allow these other components to come into action at those points
when the information needed for anaphora resolution has become available
and the resolution is necessary for interpretation to proceed. To insist that
all upper and lower indexation take place in advance of interpretation would
fly in the face of this demand. For as a rule it is only through and thus after
interpretation of the earlier parts of a discourse that the correct links for
subsequent anaphoric expressions can be established.
11 The Proper Treatment of Quantification in DRT
As we have seen above, universal quantification can be treated in terms of
D ⇒ D′, which can in turn be taken as an abbreviation of ¬ (D;¬D′).
Look again at the treatment of the quantifiers every and no in the fragment
given above.
expression category translates to type
everyi DET(i,*) λPλQλc 7→ (ui ; Pi)⇒ Qi K → K → T
noi DET(i,*) λPλQλc 7→ ¬ (ui ; Pi ; Qi) K → K → T
Working out an example like Every man walks on the basis of this gives a
representation that is equivalent to the following box notation:
(72)
x
man x ⇒ walk x
The treatment of every creates the impression that the quantificational force
resides in the dynamic implication⇒. Note, by the way, that all occurrences
of marker x in representation (72) are classically bound. The same holds for
more complex examples like the representation for (73) in (74).
(73) Every man who meets a nice woman smiles at her.
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(74)
x y
man x
woman y
nice y
meet(x,y)
⇒
z
z .= y
smile-at (x,z)
Now consider sentence (75).
(75) Most men who meet a nice woman smile at her.
This sentence is true if most individuals which satisfy the descriptive content
of the subject NP also satisfy the VP, i.e. if most men who meet a nice
woman have the property of smiling at her. Note that assessing the truth of
(75) involves two classes of men, the class of men who meet a nice woman
and the class of men who meet a nice woman and smile at her: the sentence
is true, roughly, if the cardinality of the second class is more than half that
of the first. Note that the truth conditions do not involve the comparison of
two sets of pairs of individuals—they do not compare the set of pairs (a, b)
such that a is a man, b a nice woman and a meets b with the set of pairs
(a, b) such that a is a man, b a nice woman, a meets b and a smiles at b.
One can see this by considering a situation in which one man meets lots of
women and smiles at them all whereas the other men (say, there are 20 of
them) meet very few women and never smile at any. With regard to such a
situation intuition says that (75) is false, even though the pairs (a, b) such
that a smiles at b may be a clear majority within the set of pairs (a, b) such
that a is a man, b is a nice woman and a meets b.
Thus, while the treatment of universal quantification in (74) creates the
impression that the quantificational force resides somehow in the dynamic
implication ⇒, we cannot hope that this can be extended to non-standard
quantifiers by working out special variants of dynamic implication. For
suppose that we represent (75) as (76).
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(76)
x y
man x
woman y
nice y
meet(x,y)
=m⇒
z
z .= y
smile-at (x,z)
The semantics of =m⇒ is given by:
• s[[D1 =m⇒ D2]]Ms′ iff s = s′ and for most assignments s1 with s[[D1]]Ms1
there is an assignment s2 with s1 [[D2]]
M
s2 .
Unfortunately, this analysis gives the wrong truth conditions. In the ex-
ample case, it quantifies over man-woman pairs instead of individual men.
This problem (called the proportion problem in the literature) suggests that
generalised quantifiers be added explicitly to the representation language;
see the Chapter on Quantification in this Handbook.
Assuming that what is true for most holds in essence also for every, the
above considerations show that the roles which x and y play in (74) are
not identical. The role played by x, the ‘variable bound by the quantifier’,
is special in that it is x, and only x, which determines between which sets
the generalised quantifier relation expressed by the determiner of the quan-
tifying NP can be said to hold. A notation that singles out the variable
of quantification achieves this. These considerations lead to the following
Generalised Quantifier notation for (74) and (76).
(77)
EVERY x
y
man x
woman y
nice y
meet(x,y)
z
z .= y
smile-at (x,z)
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(78)
MOST x
y
man x
woman y
nice y
meet(x,y)
z
z .= y
smile-at (x,z)
We can now revise the treatment of quantification in our fragment and
extend the coverage to other non-standard quantifiers such as most, at most
half, at least seven, as follows. Every is the function of type K → K → t that
takes two K expressions P and Q and an input context c, checks whether
all items satisfying
λx 7→ ∃c′|c| = i ∧ Pi cˆ x c′
also satisfy
λx 7→ ∃c′′∃c′|c| = i ∧ Pi cˆ x c′′ ∧ Pi cˆ x c′′ ∧Qic′′c′,
and if so, returns c as output context (and otherwise fails). Similarly for the
other generalized quantifiers.
Note that this interpretation also takes care of the ‘internal dynamics’ of the
quantification. To spell this out in terms of box satisfaction conditions we
use s[x] for an assignment which differs at most from s in the value assigned
to x, and M, s |= D for truth in M, given s.
(79) s[[Qx(D1, D2)]]Ms′ iff s = s
′ and the set of assignments s[x] for which
M, s[x] |= D1 is Q-related to the set of assignments s[x] for which
M, s[x] |= D1 ; D2.
Note the fact that the meaning of D1 figures both in the definition of the
restriction set R of the quantifier and in the definition of its body set B. The
reason for this is that D1 may introduce referents that have to be resolved
in order to get at the meaning of the body set. In the example sentence
we have to compare the set of men who meet a nice woman with the set of
men who meet a nice woman at whom they smile. Saying that we want to
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compare the set of ‘men who meet a nice woman’ with that of ‘men who
smile at her’ will not do, for the specification of the second set contains an
unresolved pronominal reference.
It seems intuitively clear that the pronoun her is to be interpreted as anaphoric
to the indefinite NP a woman. It is one of the central claims of DRT that
this kind of anaphoric connection is possible because the material of the
quantifying sentence that makes up the restrictor is also, implicitly, part
of the quantifier’s body. This principle also explains why natural language
quantifiers are always conservative, i.e. express relations between sets with
the property that for any sets A and B, A stands in the relation to B iff it
stands in the relation to A∩B. They satisfy this equation because a natural
language quantification with restrictor condition P and body condition Q
has a logical form to the effect that the quantifier relation holds between the
extension of P and the extension of P ∧Q. Conservativity is built directly
into the logical form.
For the example sentence with most, (79) gives the following meaning: for
most men who meet a nice woman it holds that they smile at at least one
nice woman that they meet. This is called the weak reading of the dy-
namic generalised quantifier. Note that under the semantics given above,
EVERY x ((y;Rxy), Sxy) is not equivalent to (x; y;Rxy) ⇒ Sxy. In the
first expression y has existential force, in the second, y has universal force.
There is no perfect agreement among speakers whether (73) and (75) can
be interpreted as having the weak reading. Some prefer the so-called strong
reading:
(80) s[[Qx(D1, D2)]]Ms′ iff s = s
′ and the set of assignments s[x] for which
M, s[x] |= D1 is Q-related to the set of assignments s[x] for which
M, s[x] |= ¬ (D1 •¬D2).
Under this interpretation for the quantifiers, EVERY x ((y;Rxy), Sxy) and
(x; y;Rxy)⇒ Sxy are equivalent.
In the definition of strong readings for the quantifiers, we again use the re-
striction set to resolve pronominal references in the specification of the body
set, and again the conservativity property of the generalized quantifier de-
notation ensures that this does not change the truth conditions. In example
case (78) the strong reading can be paraphrased as: for most men who meet
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a nice woman it holds that they smile at all the nice women that they meet.
See the Chapter on Quantification in this Handbook for more information
on how to choose between weak and strong readings of dynamic quantifiers.
12 Representing Tense and Aspect in Texts
As was said in Section 3 above, discourse representation theory was moti-
vated by a desire to give a systematic account of the interpretation of un-
bound nominal and temporal anaphora in context. In example (81), there
is not only an intended anaphoric link between the indefinite subject of the
first sentence and the pronominal subject of the second, but also between
the tenses of the verbs in the two sentences.
(81) A man entered the White Hart. He smiled.
The events described in example (81) are naturally understood as sequential,
with the event of entering preceding the event of smiling. Also, the past
tense indicates that both events precede the time of speech. A plausible
DRS representation for the example that makes this temporal anaphoric
link explicit is given in (82).
(82)
u1 u2 u3 e1 e2
man u1
u2
.= WH
enter (e1, u1, u2)
t(e1) < n
u3
.= u1
smile (e2, u3)
t(e1) < t(e2)
t(e2) < n
In this representation we have given the verbs a Davidsonian event argument
(Davidson [16]), and we have assumed that t(e) denotes the temporal interval
during which the event e takes place. Also, we assume that n (‘now’) refers
to an interval during which the text is uttered (the speech interval).
As the example representation indicates, we assume an ontology of events,
with temporal intervals at which these take place. Furthermore, we assume
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that the set of temporal intervals is ordered by precedence< and by temporal
inclusion v. We assume that t1 < t2 expresses that interval t1 completely
precedes t2, i.e., the end of t1 is before the beginning of t2, while t1 v t2
expresses that the beginning of t2 is not later than the beginning of t1 and
the end of t2 is not earlier than the end of t1.
It is plausible to further assume that < is irreflexive and transitive, while v
is a partial order (reflexive and transitive). Also, the following are plausible
interaction principles:
monotonicity (x v y ∧ y < z ∧ u v z)→ x < u.
convexity (x v u ∧ x < y ∧ y < z ∧ z v u)→ y v u.
But we will not dwell on the underlying temporal ontology; for further in-
formation on the temporal logic of intervals we refer to the Chapter on
Temporality of this Handbook and to Van Benthem [8].
In (82) the smiling event e2 is represented as following the entering event e1.
This is intuitively as it should be and has to do with the fact that in (81) the
sentence reporting the smiling event comes after the one which reports the
entering event. (Note that the interpretation given in (82) is not, or only
barely, available when the sentences of (81) are reversed.) However, the
order in which the sentences of a text appear is only one of several factors
that determine the temporal relations between the events they mention. A
second factor is aspect. For instance, when we replace the non-progressive
smiled in (81) by the progressive was smiling, there is a strong tendency
to understand the smiling as something that was going on while the man
was entering the White Hart: the progressive of an activity verb like smile
suggests, at least in narrative passages such as (81), simultaneity with the
last mentioned event, rather than succession to it. Similarly, simultaneity
rather than succession is suggested by a stative verb such as like. Consider
example (83).
(83) A man1 entered the White Hart2. He1 smiled. He1 liked the place2.
In this example, the man’s liking of the White Hart is not naturally inter-
preted as having been the case only after his smiling. Rather, it seems that
the state of affairs of his liking the establishment obtained already as he was
smiling, and possibly even before he came in. Thus, the representation of
(83) should be as in (84):
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(84)
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 e1 e2 e3
man u1 u2
.= WH
enter (e1, u1, u2) t(e1) < n
smile (e2, u3) u3
.= u1
t(e1) < t(e2)
t(e2) < n
u4
.= u1
place (u5) u5
.= u2
like (e3, u4, u5) t(e2) v t(e3)
t(e3) < n
When we consider the question whether one should assume that the man’s
liking the place in (83) anteceded his entering the White Hart, we perceive a
further factor that is important for the interpretation of temporal relations.
In order that a text is perceived as coherent, its successive sentences must
be seen as standing in certain rhetorical relations to each other. (Halliday &
Hasan [34], Mann & Thompson [48]). One such relation is explanation, a re-
lation which holds between two neighbouring sentences (or sometimes larger
units, consisting of several sentences) when the later sentence or sentence
group provides an explanation for what is claimed by the earlier sentence
or group. Like many other rhetorical relations explanation carries certain
implications form temporal order. For instance, when, say, two sentences
S and S′ are interpreted as standing in the explanation relation, with S′
providing an explanation for what is said in S, the event or state described
by S′ cannot be later than that described in S. We see this when we look
closely at (83): the man’s liking the place can either be taken as an ex-
planation of his smiling or as an explanation of why the man went to the
White Hart in the first place. The first interpretation entails that his liking
the place did not start after his smiling, but it leaves open whether he liked
the place only upon entering it or already before. According to the second
interpretation the man must have liked the place even before he went in.
We have dwelt on this dimension of the interpretation of the temporal rela-
tions in (83) to indicate how complicated the matter of interpreting temporal
relations is and how much it depends on pragmatic factors such as discourse
coherence and rhetorical relations. Just as with pronominal anaphora, lin-
guistic form does in general no more than impose a frame of constraints
within which the precise interpretation of temporal relations must be de-
cided on other grounds.
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For a presentation of the semantics of temporal reference within the very
limited space available here this poses a dilemma. On the one hand, a
presentation that does justice to what is now known about the interactions
between the different factors mentioned above is out of the question. On
the other, a general treatment of the purely grammatical constraints on
temporal reference would, in view of its inevitable lack of specificity, be
rather uninformative. We have therefore chosen to concentrate on a certain
small subclass of texts, in which rhetorical relations are fully determined by
linguistic form (by the order of the sentences in the text, by the tenses of the
verbs and by their aspectual properties). (81) and (83) are both instances
of this class.
The central idea behind the treatment we will present goes back to Reichen-
bach [54]. The interpretation of the tenses involves relating the event or
state described to a reference point. For instance, for unembedded cases
of the simple past tense, the reference point is provided by the context in
which the given past tense sentence occurs. In texts of the kind to which our
theory is intended to apply it is the immediately preceding sentence which
supplies the reference point. How the reference point is used to temporally
locate the event or state described by the sentence in question depends on
whether the sentence has stative or non-stative aspect (or, what comes to
the same in our terminology, whether what the sentence describes is a state
or an event). For past tense sentences, the difference that aspect makes is
illustrated by the distinct interpretations that are assigned to the second
and the third sentence of (83)—the event described by the second sentence
is interpreted as following the reference point by the preceding sentence,
the state described by the third sentence as obtaining at the reference point
provided by its predecessor. Moreover, an event sentence like the second
sentence of (83) resets the reference point it inherits from the context to
the event it itself introduces, whereas a stative sentence like the third one
passes the reference point on to the next sentence unchanged. (To test this,
see what happens when one adds a fourth sentence, stative or non-stative,
on to (83)).
Besides playing a role in locating the described event or state in relation
to the reference point, tense forms usually also have an ‘absolute’ semantic
impact in that they relate the described state or event to the utterance time.
For instance, unembedded occurrences of the past tense imply that the state
or event lies before the utterance time and unembedded occurrences of the
English present tense imply, with few exceptions, location at the utterance
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time.
For the limited domain to which our ‘mini theory’ is meant to apply, the
use and modification of reference points can be elegantly handled along the
lines proposed by Muskens [49]. As noted there, in a dynamic set-up it is
natural to implement the reference interval as a register r to which a new
value get assigned for a non-stative verb, while the value is unaffected for
stative verbs. For instance, the lexical entry for smiled specifies that the
interval of the smiling event is constrained to follow the current reference
interval, that the reference interval is reset to the interval of the event, and
that the event interval has to precede the interval of speech:
λv(e; smile (e, v); r < t(e); r := t(e); r < n).
Here r := t(e) is shorthand for r; r .= t(e).
For verbs denoting stative events, the representation is the same, except for
the fact that now the current reference interval has to be included in the
event interval, and the reference interval is not reset. Here is a lexical entry
for liked :
λPλu(Pλv(e; like (e, u, v); r v t(e); r < n)).
Figure 10 gives a list of lexical entries for stative and non-stative main verbs
and for temporal auxiliary verbs.
expression category translates to type
does not AUX λPλv¬ (P (v); r v n) ((e,T),(e,T))
did not AUX λPλv¬ (P (v); r < n) ((e,T),(e,T))
will AUX λPλv(P (v);n < r) ((e,T),(e,T))
will not AUX λPλv¬ (P (v);n < r) ((e,T),(e,T))
smiles VP(Tensed) λv(e; smile (e, v); r < t(e); r := t(e); r v n) (e,T)
smiled VP(Tensed) λv(e; smile (e, v); r < t(e); r := t(e); r < n) (e,T)
smile VP(Inf) λv(e; smile (e, v); r < t(e); r := t(e)) (e,T)
hates TV(Tensed) λPλu(Pλv(e; hate (e, u, v); r v t(e); r v n)) (((e,T),T),(e,T))
hated TV(Tensed) λPλu(Pλv(e; hate (e, u, v); r v t(e); r < n)) (((e,T),T),(e,T))
hate TV(Inf) λPλu(Pλv(e; hate (e, u, v); r v t(e))) (((e,T),T),(e,T))
likes TV(Tensed) λPλu(Pλv(e; like (e, u, v); r v t(e); r v n)) (((e,T),T),(e,T))
liked TV(Tensed) λPλu(Pλv(e; like (e, u, v); r v t(e); r < n)) (((e,T),T),(e,T))
like TV(Inf) λPλu(Pλv(e; like (e, u, v); r v t(e); )) (((e,T),T),(e,T))
Figure 10: Lexical entries for main and auxiliary verbs.
Note that in defining disjoint merge for fragments involving the markers r
and n for the reference and the speech interval, we have to make sure that
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these never get renamed. For n, we get this for free, for an inspection of
the lexical entries makes clear that n is a fixed marker of every DRS, as it
never gets introduced. For r matters are different: r := t(e) is shorthand for
r; r .= t(e), so r does get introduced. But we do not want r := t(e1);D1•r :=
t(e2);D2 to reduce to r := t(e1);D; r′ := t(e2); [r′/r]D2. To ensure that this
does not happen, it is enough to exclude r from the set of reference markers;
this guarantees that r := t(e1);D1; r := t(e2);D2 is a proper DRS if D1;D2
is one, because r /∈ intro(r := t(e2);D2).
Let us go through the procedure of building the representation for (83),
assuming the antecedent and anaphoric indices to be as given in the example.
The representation of entered the White Hart becomes (85).
(85)
λPλu(Pλv(e; enter (e, u, v); r < t(e); r := t(e); r < n))
(λP (u2
.= WH • P (u2))).
After β reduction:
(86) λu(u2
.= WH • (e; enter (e, u, u2); r < t(e); r := t(e); r < n)).
Combining with the translation of a man and reducing the result gives (87).
(87) u1•man u1•(u2 .= WH•(e; enter (e, u1, u2); r < t(e); r := t(e); r < n)).
Merge reduction with the identical renaming gives:
(88) u1; man u1;u2
.= WH; e; enter (e, u1, u2); r < t(e); r := t(e); r < n.
Similarly, we get for he smiled, after β and merge reduction:
(89) e; smile(e, u1); r < t(e); r := t(e); r < n.
The text consisting of the first two sentences gets the following translation
after β reduction:
(90)
u1; man u1;u2
.= WH; e; enter (e, u1, u2); r < t(e); r := t(e); r < n
• e; smile(e, u1); r < t(e); r := t(e); r < n.
After merge reduction, this becomes:
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(91)
u1; man u1;u2
.= WH; e; enter (e, u1, u2); r < t(e); r := t(e); r < n;
e2; smile(e2, u1); r < t(e2); r := t(e2); r < n.
The translation of the third sentence from the discourse, after β and merge
reduction:
(92) u3;u3
.= u2; place u3; e; like(e, u1, u3); r v t(e); r < n.
The translation of the whole example, after β and merge reduction:
(93)
u1; man u1;u2
.= WH; e; enter (e, u1, u2); r < t(e); r := t(e); r < n;
e2; smile(e2, u1); r < t(e2); r := t(e2); r < n;
u3;u3
.= u2; place u3; e3; like(e3, u1, u3); r v t(e3); r < n.
Evidently this treatment of temporal reference is to be seen as no more than
a hint of the direction that a fully fledged account of tense and aspect for a
language like English might take. One feature of our treatment that ought to
be changed is the use of separate lexical entries for full forms of verbs, such
as smiled and smiles. What one would like to have instead is specifications
of the meaning and/or function of the different tenses, such that when these
are applied to the entries for the infinitival forms of our mini-lexicon we
get the entries of the corresponding full forms as results. For instance, one
might consider assigning the Simple Past the following entry
expression category translates to type
Simple Past VP(Tensed)/VP(Perf) λPλv(P (v); r < n) ((e,T),(e,T))
Indeed, applying this entry to the entries for smile and like produces the
translations that our lexicon specifies for smiled and liked.
But here it behoves to repeat an earlier caveat. Tense forms do not always
function in the same way. In particular, embedded occurrences of tenses
often behave quite differently than when they occur in unembedded posi-
tions. (To cite just one example, involving the simple past, recall Baker’s:
“I thought you were going to say that you had only one trick to play.” Here
the past tense of had is compatible with the event in question being located
in the future of the utterance time.) So, if we adopt the entry just proposed
as entry for the ‘Past Tense’ in general, we will have to distinguish carefully
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between occurrences of the Past Tense in the semantic sense characterized
by this entry on the one hand and, on the other hand, arbitrary occurrences
of simple past tense morphology. But this is a distinction which requires a
careful revision of the syntax-semantics interface used in our mini-fragment;
and it is only one example among many which render such a revision neces-
sary.
Another matter which seriously complicates the treatment of temporal ref-
erence is aspect. We already saw that the temporal relations between the
states and events that are mentioned by sentences in a text depend in part
on the aspectual properties of those sentences (i.e., in our terminology, on
whether what they describe is a state or an event) and that the aspectual
properties of those sentences depend in their turn on the aspectual proper-
ties of the verbs they contain. However, as noted explicitly first in Verkuyl
[66], the aspectual properties of a sentence depend not just on its verb but on
several other factors as well. Prominent among those factors is the question
whether the verb has been modified by some aspectual operator, such as the
English perfect or progressive, or aspectual control verbs such as begin, stop
or go on. It is natural to try and treat aspectual modifiers along the same
lines as we have suggested for the tenses, viz by assigning them their own
lexical entries, which then should combine systematically with the entry of
any verb to which the operators can be applied (e.g. through functional
application of the operator entry to the verb entry). But here we encounter
a new difficulty, which is especially noticeable in relation to the progressive,
and known in that context as the imperfective paradox. A simple-minded
analysis of the progressive might treat it as transforming a given verb phrase
VP into one which describes a process or state holding at precisely those
times that fall within the duration of any state or event described by VP.
With telic verbal predicates such as cross the street, however, this analysis
breaks down, for a sentence involving the progressive of such a verb phrase
can be true at times when an event described by the embedded VP did not
actually happen. For instance, The old lady was crossing the street may
be true with respect to times not included in the duration of any crossing-
the-street event. For the lady may have changed her mind when she got
halfway and turned around to the sidewalk from which she started, or she
may have become a victim to the incalculable brutalities of motorized traf-
fic. Thus the semantic relation between progressives and their underlying
VPs is in general an intensional rather than a purely extensional one, and a
fully satisfactory analysis of this intensional relationship is still lacking.
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Formulating an entry for the English perfect, which transforms a verb phrase
VP into one which describes result states of events or states described by VP,
may at first seem less problematic: the states described by the application
of the perfect hold at precisely those times which follow a state or event
of the type defined by the operand. But when one looks at the semantics
of the perfect more closely, such simplicity proves illusory. It is part of
the meanings of many perfects that the event of which the described state is
understood to be the result did not just happen at some earlier time or other,
but that it happened only recently, or that its influence is still tangible at the
time of the result state; and these additional meaning components cannot be
analyzed in purely extensional terms any more than the relationship between
progressive and non-progressive uses of telic verb phrases.
For the perfect it is nevertheless possible to finesse the intensionality problem
by assuming a relation ; between events and states which holds between
e and e′ when e′ is the result state of e. We adopt the obvious assumption
that e; e′ entails t(e) < t(e′). Using ;, (94) might be represented as (95).
(94) Bill has smiled.
(95)
e1 e2
u
.= b
smile (e1, u)
e1 ; e2
t(e2) v n
This does not yet constrain the effect on the wider context. The effect is
roughly this. First the current value of the reference interval is saved. Then
r is reset to a value earlier than its old value. Next the verb is evaluated with
respect to the shifted reference interval. Then the old value is restored, and
finally the reference interval is located with respect to the speech interval
(Muskens [49]).
Using o as a store for the old value of r, we get the following DRS that also
takes the external effects into account:
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(96)
e1 e2 o
u
.= b
o
.= r
¬¬
r
r < o
smile (e1, u)
e1 ; e2
r < t(e1)
r := t(e2)
r v n
For a compositional account, we have to assume that we can get access to
the event parameter of a verb, so a typical entry for untensed verbs will now
look like this:
expression category translates to type
smile VP(Inf) λeλv(smile (e, v); r < t(e); r := t(e)) (e,(e,T))
The entry of the perfective operator introduces two events: the verb phrase
event and the consequent state (assume R ranges over type (e, (e, T ))).
expression category translates to type
PERF VP(Perf)/ λRλv(e1; e2; o := r; ((e,(e,T)),
VP(Inf) ¬¬ (r; r < o;R(e1)(v); e1 ; e2); (e,T))
r < t(e2); r := t(e2))
Temporal auxiliaries will now have the effect of putting further temporal
constraints, as discussed above. For instance the present tense form has of
the perfect auxiliary have could be given the following entry:
expression category translates to type
has VP(Tensed)/VP(Perf) λPλv(P (v); r v n) ((e,T),(e,T))
This section has presented a catalogue of problems rather than a list of
fully satisfactory solutions. The emphasis on problems with the analysis of
tense and aspect may have served to illustrate a dilemma that one faces in
formal approaches to the semantics of natural language discourse such as
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DRT. The dilemma is this: the more closely one tries to stick to the ideal
of strict compositionality when dealing with the manifold complexities of
the syntax-semantics interface of natural languages, the trickier the analysis
tends to become, especially if discourse effects are to be taken into account
too.
There exists a good deal of work within DRT, current as well as past, which
has been prepared to sacrifice certain aspects of this ideal in pursuit of a
more flexible architecture that can be fitted more easily to the requirements
that certain linguistic phenomena seem to impose. This does not mean that
this work ignores the fundamental compositional imperative of explaining
how grammars can be finitely encoded and languages can be used by beings
whose knowledge of language takes this finitary form. In particular, a good
part of the work within DRT on the problems of tense and aspect has opted
for such a relaxation of strict compositionality. However, experience of the
past ten years has shown that often, once the phenomena have been prop-
erly understood and have been given a systematic description using means
that are not strictly compositional, it is then possible to also find a way of
accounting for those phenomena that is strictly compositional, as well as at-
tractive in other ways. Whether attractive strictly compositional solutions
will become available in all cases is yet to be seen.
13 Extensions and Variations
An important extension of the representation language concerns the sin-
gular/plural distinction. Singular and plural reference markers should be
distinguished, and a constraint imposed that singular pronouns are linked
to singular discourse referents, plural pronouns to plural reference markers.
Accounting for plural anaphoric possibilities along these lines involves quite
a lot of further work, however, as delicate issues concerning the formation
of plurals by means of summation and abstraction, and the interpretation
of dependent plurals have to be dealt with (Kamp and Reyle [38], Chapter
4).
Another fruitful application area for theories about the representation of
discourse in context is the area of presupposition. Presuppositions can get
cancelled or weakened by an evolving context; in other words, presupposi-
tion projection is a dynamic phenomenon. Approaches to presupposition in
connection with discourse representation are of two kinds. The first kind
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exploits the representationalism inherent in the framework. See, e.g., Van
der Sandt [59], where the presupposition facts get accounted for in terms
of manipulations of the representations. The second kind does not assume
representationalism but exploits the dynamic aspect of the theory by pro-
viding a partial dynamic semantics fitting the presupposition facts. See,
e.g., the account of the presuppositions of definite descriptions in Van Eijck
[20], which does not depend on properties of the representations, but only
on the underlying ‘error state’ semantics. Further references in the Chapter
on Presupposition in this Handbook.
A next extension concerns the representation of belief sentences. The Hob
Nob sentence from Section 3 provides an example of a belief puzzle that
seems amenable to solution within the present framework. A theory of repre-
sentation of discourse in context holds a particular promise for the treatment
of belief because the representation structures themselves could be viewed
as a kind of mental representation language; thus a belief relation could
typically be modelled as a relation between a subject and a representation
structure (Asher [3]).
The plausibility of using Discourse Representation Structures to model belief
and other propositional attitudes is closely connected with the existence of
cognitively plausible inference systems for DRSs. For work on proof theories
for DRSs see Sedogbo and Eytan [61], Saurer [60] and Kamp and Reyle [39].
A different approach is reasoning about discourse structures with assertion
logic and dynamic logic. Assume a language of quantified dynamic logic
with discourse representation structures as program modalities 〈D〉 and
[D]. Then 〈D〉φ and [D]φ get interpreted as follows:
• M, s |= 〈D〉φ iff there is an s′ with s[[D]]Ms′ and M, s′ |= φ.
• M, s |= [D]φ iff for all s′ with s[[D]]Ms′ it holds that M, s′ |= φ.
An axiomatisation of discourse representation theory along the same lines
as the calculus for dynamic predicate logic [33] given in Van Eijck [21] is
now readily available. Some example principles of this calculus are:
〈¬D〉φ↔ ([D]⊥ ∧ φ).
〈D1 ⇒ D2〉φ↔ ([D1]〈D2〉> ∧ φ).
〈D1;D2〉φ↔ 〈D1〉〈D2〉φ.
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For marker introduction we have:
〈u〉φ↔ ∃uφ,
or dually:
[u]φ↔ ∀uφ.
For atoms we have:
〈Pt1 · · · tn〉φ↔ (Pt1 · · · tn ∧ φ),
or dually:
[Pt1 · · · tn]φ↔ (Pt1 · · · tn → φ).
The calculus nicely demonstrates the way in which discourse representation
theory gives universal force to the markers introduced in the antecedent of
an if–then clause.
(97) If a man greets a woman he smiles at her.
(98) (x;Mx; y;Wy;Gxy)⇒ Sxy.
The truth conditions of (97), represented as (98), are given by the following
calculation that uses the principles above.
〈(x;Mx; y;Wy;Gxy)⇒ Sxy〉>
↔ [x;Mx; y;Wy;Gxy]〈Sxy〉>
↔ [x][Mx][y][Wy][Gxy]〈Sxy〉>
↔ ∀x([Mx][y][Wy][Gxy]〈Sxy〉>)
↔ · · ·
↔ ∀x(Mx→ ∀y(Wy → (Gxy → Sxy))).
An important new direction is the theory of Underspecified Discourse Rep-
resentation Structures which allows for representations that leave certain
matters, such as scope relations between quantifiers and other operators,
the distinction between distributive and collective readings of plural NPs,
that between different readings of a given lexical item, etc. undecided. This
work is of particular interest insofar as it has succeeded in developing proof
theories that operate directly on the underspecified representations them-
selves (Reyle [55, 56]).
75
A Simplified representation of contexts
As an extension of our treatment above we will now consider a simplified
representation of contexts as stacks of references to entities.
If the context has name c and length i, then the reference markers are called
c0, . . . , ci−1 (or c[0], . . . , c[i− 1], for those who prefer the programmers’ way
of referring to array indexing). Extending a context c of length i with a
‘fresh’ reference marker can now consist of incrementing the length of the
context to i + 1 and adding marker ci to it. As we will show in the next
section, this approach allows the formulation of an elegant type theoretical
version of discourse representation theory, thus facilitating the definition
of natural language fragments with a dynamic flavour in the manner of
Montague grammar.
Representing discourse in context by means of context updating while putting
appropriate constraints on the evolving context can be viewed as construct-
ing a function with the following shape:
λ
context
constraints
7→

context
constraints
+
context extension
constraints extension

The compositional version of DRT presented in the fragment given in Section
10 below works according to this pattern. It assumes that contexts are lists
of reference markers, together with their values, and that constraints are
expressed as DRS conditions.
A simplified representation is possible by taking contexts to be lists of ref-
erence markers with canonical names c0, c1, . . . . If we view a context as the
one-variable version of Vermeulen’s sequence semantics [67], then a context
is just a stack of items:
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 · · ·
Existential quantification now is context extension: it pushes a new item d
on the context stack:
c0 c1 c2 c3 + d = c0 c1 c2 c3 d
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We can use indices to refer to the items:
0 1 2 3 4 · · · n− 1 n
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 · · · cn−1 d
If c is a context, c[0] is its first element, and |c| is its length. So the context
elements are c[0] up to c[k] where k = |c| − 1.
A context has the type of a list of entities. Call this type [e]. Assume c, c′
are of type [e] and that x is of type e. Then we use cˆ x to denote the result of
extending context c with item x. Note that the type of (ˆ ) is [e]→ e→ [e],
and that cˆ x is a new context with |cˆ x| = |c| + 1 (the context length has
increased by 1). Now we can define dynamic existential quantification as
follows:
∃ := λcλc′ 7→ ∃x(cˆ x = c′)
Thus, the quantifier ∃ is interpreted as a context extender. It extends an
input context c with an element x from the domain, and creates an output
context cˆ x. More precisely, ∃x(cˆ x = c′) states the conditions under which
c′ is an appropriate output context, given that c is the input context.
We see that ∃ has the type [e] → [e] → t. The operation ∃ takes a list of
entities c (an input context) and a second context c′ (an output context),
and it states the conditions under which c and c′ are properly related. In
DRT terms, ∃ expresses ‘take a new reference marker and extend the context
with that marker’.
The type [e] → [e] → t is essentially the type of a binary relation on con-
texts; call such relations on contexts context transitions. In a compositional
account of context shifting, this is the fundamental type. A DRT version of
extensional Montague grammar can now be viewed as a lift of the type t to
[e]→ [e]→ t.
Instead of conjunction (type t → t → t) we get sequential composition of
contexts, with type ([e] → [e] → t) → ([e] → [e] → t) → [e] → [e] → t).
Assume that φ, ψ are context transitions (i.e., φ, ψ have type [e]→ [e]→ t)
and that c, c′ are contexts (c, c′ have type [e]). Then the following operation
defines context composition:
φ ; ψ := λcλc′ 7→ ∃c′′(φcc′′ ∧ ψc′′c′)
Since φ, ψ are parameters, we can define the operation ; as:
λφλψλcλc′ 7→ ∃c′′(φcc′′ ∧ ψc′′c′)
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The definitions of ∃ and ; are the key ingredients in the definition of the
semantics of the indefinite determiner. Note ; defines a sequential merge
operation for context transitions. Before we proceed, we introduce the type
theoretic version of the introduction of a reference marker, by means of the
following combinator u.
u = λiλcλc′ 7→ |c| = i ∧ ∃x(cˆ x = c′).
Variable i ranges over natural numbers, so this defines a function of type
N → [e] → [e] → t. Writing the application ui as ui, we get from the
definition of u:
ui = λcλc′ 7→ |c| = i ∧ ∃x(cˆ x = c′).
This means that ui denotes the context transition that consists of selecting
an input context of length i and extending that context with a new element.
The entry for the indefinite noun phrase a man should express that an input
context c can be extended with a new element, that this new element has
to be a man, that it also has to satisfy the body of the determiner, and that
it will remain accessible for future reference. If we assume the context has
length i, then the new element will be at position i in the new context. This
gives:
a man: λQλc 7→ ci
Man ci
; Q i where i = |c|
But now we have to realize that the box notation is shorthand for a context
transition. The fine structure is given by the sequential composition of ui
(the operation for selecting a context of length i and extending that context
with a new element), and a context transition M that consists of predicating
the property Man of the new element in context.
The predication Q has to be of a type that combines with an index i to yield
a context transition. This is type N → [e] → [e] → t, the type of natural
number pointers into context transitions. We still have to abstract over the
restriction of the indefinite. Let the type of the restriction be the same as
that of Q (the body).
Assume P and Q are pointers into context transitions, and c is a context.
Then the lexical entry for the indefinite determiner a looks like this:
λPλQ 7→ (ui ; Pi ; Qi). (1)
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Abbreviating N→ [e]→ [e]→ t as K, we can express the type of this entry
as K → K → [e] → [e] → t. An indefinite determiner translates into a
function that takes a pointer into a context transition for the restriction,
a pointer into a context transition for the body, and then yields a context
transition.
What the entry for the indefinite determiner says is that the input context c
has length i, that it can be extended with a new element, and that this new
element will satisfy both P and Q, and it will remain accessible for future
reference.
The final thing that is missing is the lift from unary predicates (the type of
the regular denotation for entries like man) to pointers into context transi-
tions. Here is a function for achieving that lift:
λAλiλcλc′ 7→ c = c′ ∧A(ci).
This takes a unary predicate (A has type e→ t) and yields a function of type
K. The new function puts a constraint on the current context c, namely the
constraint that the item at position i in that context has to satisfy predicate
A.
For the treatment of universal noun phrases like every man we need either
a combination of dynamic negation and sequential composition, or an op-
eration for dynamic implication. The way to express context negation or
dynamic negation in DRT is this:
⇒ ⊥
The typed logical version is the following, where φ represents the embedded
representation structure.
¬ φ := λcc′ 7→ (c = c′ ∧ ¬∃c′′φcc′′)
This defines a relation between input context c and output context c′ where
the input context equals the output context, and where there is no extension
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c′′ of context c for which φ holds. Abstracting from the embedded context
transition, we get the following type logical definition for dynamic negation:
λφcc′ 7→ (c = c′ ∧ ¬∃c′′φcc′′)
Dynamic implication can be defined in a similar way:
φ⇒ ψ := λcλc′ 7→ (c = c′ ∧ ∀c2(φcc2 → ∃c3ψc2c3).
Abstracting from the two context transitions φ, ψ, this gives:
λφλψλcλc′ 7→ (c = c′ ∧ ∀c2(φcc2 → ∃c3ψc2c3).
Compare this to the truth definition for DRS conditions of the form
⇒ .
Now the lexical entry for the determiner every can be phrased in terms of
dynamic implication, as follows:
λPλQ 7→ ((ui ; Pi)⇒ Qi) (2)
Note that (ui ; Pi) ⇒ Qi is a context transition, with type [e] → [e] → t.
Therefore, the type of the translation of every is K → K → [e]→ [e]→ t.
Another way to phrase the lexical entry for the determiner every is as follows:
λPλQλc 7→ (¬ (ui ; Pi ; ¬Qi)).
It is left to the reader to check that this is equivalent to the definition in
(2).
With these ingredients we give a compositional treatment of the following
discourse:
A woman entered and a woman left. (3)
Here are the representations for a woman, entered , and left :
a woman: λQλcλc′ 7→ ∃x(W x ∧Qi(cˆ x)c′) where i = |c|
entered : λjλcλc′ 7→ (c = c′ ∧ E cj) where j ∈ |c|
left : λjλcλc′ 7→ (c = c′ ∧ L cj) where j ∈ |c|
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The notation j ∈ |c| is shorthand for j ∈ {0, . . . , |c| − 1}. Note that the
constraint on j is in fact a restriction on the type of j to a subset of N.
The above entries yield the following representation for A woman entered :
λcλc′ 7→ ∃x(W x ∧ E (cˆ x)[i] ∧ cˆ x = c′) (4)
This reduces to (5).
λcλc′ 7→ ∃x(W x ∧ E x ∧ cˆ x = c′) (5)
Similarly, we get the following as representation for A woman left :
λcλc′ 7→ ∃x(W x ∧ L x ∧ cˆ x = c′) (6)
Combining (5) and (6) by means of and (translated as λφλψ 7→ φ ; ψ) gives
the following representation for A woman entered and a woman left :
λcλc′ 7→ ∃x(W x ∧ E x ∧ cˆ x = c′) ; λcλc′ 7→ ∃x(W x ∧ L x ∧ cˆ x = c′)
This reduces to the following (note the renaming of variables):
λcλc1 7→ ∃x(W x ∧ E x ∧ cˆ x = c1) ; λc2λc′ 7→ ∃y(W y ∧ L y ∧ c2 yˆ = c′)
Applying the ; combinator and using β reduction gives:
λcc′ 7→ ∃c′′∃x(M x ∧ E x ∧ cˆ x = c′′ ∧ ∃y(M y ∧ L y ∧ c′′ˆ y = c′)).
By simple equality reasoning, this reduces to:
λcλc′ 7→ ∃x(W x ∧ E x ∧ ∃y(W y ∧ L y ∧ cˆ x yˆ = c′)).
So the interpretation of (3) sets up an appropriate context with references
to two women, with the right constraints.
B Pronouns and Anaphoric Reference
The correct interpretation of pronouns and anaphoric definite descriptions
should allow picking up appropriate references from the existing context.
A new customer entered the shop. He asked for the manager. (7)
A new customer entered the shop. The man smiled. (8)
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On the most salient reading of (7), he is interpreted as an anaphoric reference
to a new customer, and the manager is interpreted as the manager of the
shop. On the most salient reading of (8), the man is interpreted as an
anaphoric reference to a new customer. To pick up such references, the
available context information should include gender and number, actor focus
(agent of the sentence), and discourse focus (‘what is talked about’ in the
sentence). The most important, however, is the list of available referents.
Spelling out a full fledged anaphoric reference resolution mechanism is be-
yond the scope of this addendum. Instead, we will describe how anaphoric
linking to a given object ci (or c[i] in array notation) in context c is to be
implemented. So we assume that resolution in context c has taken place,
and we show that the linking to the appropriate item gets encoded by means
of an appropriate lexical item for pronouns. More in particular:
A new customer entered the shop. He0 smiled. (9)
Here, the index indicates that he gets resolved to the first introduced referent
in context, i.e., to the referent for a new customer.
The following lexical entry for indexed pronouns accomplishes that the pro-
noun hei gets resolved to item i in context. Assume that Q has type
e→ [e]→ [e]→ t and that c, c′ have type [e]. Then the following translation
for hei has type [e]→ [e]→ t.
hei: λQλcλc′ 7→ Q(ci)cc′
C Once More: DRSs for Natural Language Frag-
ments
We can now redo the fragment from Section 10. If we start out with basic
types e for entities and t for truth values, we can define the type of contexts
as [e] (lists of entities), that of context transitions T as [e] → [e] → t, and
that of indices into context transitions K as N→ T .
In the present set-up (unlike in that of Asher [4], Bos et al. [12], Kuschert
[47], Muskens [50], and Section 10, there is no need to distinguish between
variables of the typed logic and reference markers.
The composition of representation structures for example sentences from this
fragment is a matter of routine. See Gamut [30] for a didactic account of the
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expression category translates to type
ai DET(i,*) λPλQλc 7→ (ui ; Pi ; Qi) K → K → T
everyi DET(i,*) λPλQλc 7→ (ui ; Pi)⇒ Qi K → K → T
noi DET(i,*) λPλQλc 7→ ¬ (ui ; Pi ; Qi) K → K → T
anotherij DET(i,j) λPλQλc 7→ ui ; NEQ ij ; Pi ; Qi K → K → T
where NEQ ij equals λcλc′ 7→ c = c′ ∧ ci 6= cj T
theij DET(i,j) λPλQλc 7→ ui ; EQ ij ; Pi ; Qi K → K → T
where EQ ij equals λcλc′ 7→ c = c′ ∧ ci = cj T
hisij DET(i,j) λPλQλc 7→ ui ; POSS ji ; Pi ; Qi K → K → T
where POSS ji equals λcλc′ 7→ c = c′ ∧ poss (cj , ci) T
Billi NP(*,*,i) λP 7→ (I b i ; Pi) K → T
where I b i equals λcλc′ 7→ c = c′ ∧ ci = b T
who REL λPλQλi 7→ (Qi ; Pi) K → K → K
hei NP(nom,*,i) λP 7→ Pi K → T
himi NP(acc,*,i) λP 7→ Pi K → T
man CN λiλcλc′ 7→ (c = c′ ∧man ci) K
boy CN λiλcλc′ 7→ (c = c′ ∧ boy ci) K
smiles VP(Tensed) λiλcλc′ 7→ (c = c′ ∧ smile ci) K
smile VP(Inf) λiλcλc′ 7→ (c = c′ ∧ smile ci) K
has TV(Tensed) λPλi 7→ (P(λj 7→ (POSS i j)) (K → T )→ K
where POSS i j = λcλc′ 7→ c = c′ ∧ poss (ci, cj) T
have TV(Inf) λPλi 7→ (P(λj 7→ (POSS i j)) (K → T )→ K
where POSS i j = λcλc′ 7→ c = c′ ∧ poss (ci, cj) T
hates TV(Tensed) λPλi 7→ (P(λjλcλc′ 7→ (c = c′ ∧ hate (ci, cj))) (K → T )→ K
hate TV(Inf) λPλi 7→ (P(λjλcλc′ 7→ (c = c′ ∧ hate (ci, cj))) (K → T )→ K
does not AUX λPλi 7→ ¬ Pi K → K
if (S/S)/S λpλq 7→ (p⇒ q) T → T → T
. S\(TXT/S) λpλq 7→ (p ; q) T → T → T
. TXT\(TXT/S) λpλq 7→ (p ; q) T → T → T
Figure 11: Lexical component of the toy fragment for English.
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general procedure, and Van Eijck and Unger [27] for a textbook treatment
including an implementation of dynamic semantics using the technique.
As in the previous fragment, there is an implicit assumption that the texts
to which our theory is applied come fully equipped with all the necessary
upper and lower indices and that all of these have been assigned in advance.
Again, this assumption gets us into difficulties. Consider text (99).
(99) A mani who mistrusted the assistantjk walked in. Hei asked for the
managerjm. Hej turned out to be on holiday.
If this text is processed incrementally, first representations are built for the
first two sentences and these are combined. Only then is a representation
for the third sentence combined with the representation of the preceding
discourse. Note that in this case the representation of the second sentence
puts a constraint on the context produced by the first sentence that cannot
be fulfilled. The input context contains a representation for the assistant, at
position j, so it has length > j. The indexing for the manager would force
the context to have length j, which is impossible. The solution is to choose
a different upper index for the manager, to avoid the clash.
D Salience Updating as Context Manipulation
A suitable interface for anaphora resolution needs to incorporate a notion of
salience, or measure of availability of referents as candidates for resolution.
Surface syntactic form is an important determinant for salience. E.g., it is
usually assumed that a subject is more salient than an object. Thus, the
first choice for resolving he in (10) is a farmer.
A farmer hit a gentleman. He was upset. (10)
And the first choice for resolving he in (11) is a gentleman.
A gentleman was hit by a farmer. He was upset. (11)
In these two examples, a farmer and a gentleman are the two obvious can-
didates for resolving the reference of the pronoun he, because both a farmer
and a gentleman have been made salient by the preceding text. Consider
the following context:
84
Pedro Bernardo Don Diego
Salience update in context is a reshuffle of the order of importance of the
items in a context list. This may make Don Diego the most salient item:
Don Diego Pedro Bernardo
To allow reshuffling of a context with Don Diego in it, in such a way that we
do not lose track of him, we represent contexts as lists of indexed objects,
with the indices running from 0 to the length of the context minus 1:
0
Don Diego
1
Bernardo
2
Pedro
Reshuffling this to make Pedro most salient gives:
2
Pedro
0
Don Diego
1
Bernardo
Note that the indices 0, . . . , n − 1 determine a permutation of the context
list. We call these lists of indexed objects contexts under permutation.
In a context c, the entity with index i is given by c[∗i].
 2Pedro 0Don Diego 1Bernardo
 [∗0] = Don Diego
If c is a context under permutation, let (i)c be the result of placing the item
(i, c[∗i]) upfront. Here is an example:
(1)
 2Pedro 0Don Diego 1Bernardo
 =
1
Bernardo
2
Pedro
0
Don Diego
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(i)c is the result of moving the item with index i to the head position of
the context list. Successive applications of this operation can generate all
permutations of a context. If d is an object and c a context, then d : c is
the result of putting item (|c|, d) at the head position of the context list.
Don Alejandro :
 2Pedro 0Don Diego 1Bernardo
 =
3
Don Alejandro
1
Bernardo
2
Pedro
0
Don Diego
The operation (:) is used for adding a new element to the context, in most
salient position. Using this, and introducing a type p[e] for contexts under
permutation, we can give a type theoretical version of discourse representa-
tion that allows salience updating. Assume c, c′ are variables of type p[e],
and P,Q are variables of type N→ p[e]→ p[e]→ t. Then the new definition
of context extension runs as follows:
∃ := λcc′ 7→ ∃x((x : c) = c′)
Here (x : c) means that x is added to the context, at the most salient posi-
tion. The lift of unary predicates to pointers into context-under-permutation
transitions that is necessary to make this work is defined as:
λAλiλcλc′ 7→ c = c′ ∧A(c[∗i]).
The new translation of a man effects a salience reshuffle:
λQcc′ 7→ |c| = i ∧ ∃x(Man x ∧Qi(x : c)c′).
The referent x for the indefinite gets put in most salient position in the new
context by means of the operation x : c. Note that (x : c)[∗i] will pick up x.
E Further Reading
Two key publications on discourse representation are Heim [35] and Kamp
[37], which address themselves specifically to the problem of the interpre-
tation of indefinite descriptions and their interaction with unbound and
transsentential anaphora. Temporal anaphora, a kind of anaphora that is
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largely transsentential, is treated along the same lines in Kamp and Rohrer
[41]. A systematic presentation of discourse representation theory includ-
ing various later developments is given in Kamp and Reyle [38]. Asher [4]
extends DRT to a more comprehensive theory which among other things
also takes discourse structure and rhetorical relations into account. The
connections between the principles of DRT and those of generative syntax
are explored in depth in Chierchia [14]. Questions of lexical semantics from
a DR-theoretical perspective are explored in Kamp and Rossdeutscher [42].
A precursor paper is Karttunen [44]. Examples of related approaches to
semantics which have also advocated focusing on the discourse level are
Seuren’s discourse semantics [62], Barwise’s dynamic interpretation of anaphora
[7], and the game theoretical school of Hintikka c.s. [36].
Further references on the connection with dynamic reasoning are given in
the Chapter on Dynamics in this Handbook. Connections between discourse
representation and type theory are sketched in Ahn and Kolb [1]. Connec-
tions between discourse representation and game theoretical semantics are
given in Van Benthem and Van Eijck [9].
The mathematics of context and context extension has developed into a
topic in its own right; see, e.g., [71]. A version of DRT called incremen-
tal dynamics is presented in [23]. This framework can be viewed as the
one-variable version of sequence semantics for dynamic predicate logic, as
proposed in [67]. Incremental dynamics is described in terms of polymorphic
type theory in [22]. This system makes clear how the instruction to take
fresh discourse referents when needed can be made fully precise by using
the standard toolset of (polymorphic) type theory. Such a reconstruction of
DRT in type theory does justice to the incrementality and the finite state
semantics of the original. The proposal for the treatment of salience in Sec-
tion D of this addendum is worked out as a fragment with a mechanism for
reference resolution in a textbook chapter in [27]. This treatment should
be compared with the treatment of pronoun resolution in DRT proposed in
the second volume of [11], as well as with the earlier proposal for pronoun
resolution in DRT in [72]. Discourse semantics in the style of Kamp and
Heim can be viewed as a form of continuation passing style semantics for
texts. This connection is worked out further in [17] and [6].
To change a function f of type a → b into a continuation passing style
function f ′ of type a → (b → c) → c, one can define f ′ as λxλg 7→ g(fx).
Then f ′ is a function that first takes an x, next takes a continuation function
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g, then starts to computes like f , but instead of returning the result fx,
applies the function g to that result.
If we look at this more closely, we see that this can be viewed as a com-
bination of application and argument raising, as follows. Define R(x) as
λg 7→ gx. Then f ′ can be redefined as λx 7→ R(fx). The reader who is
familiar with Montague semantics has no doubt seen this argument raising
before. This is how Montague grammar deals with proper names, to assim-
ilate them to the type of generalized quantifiers. Reynolds, in his overview
of the use of continuations in computer science [57], shows that continua-
tions were invented over and over again. We can add that the person who
reinvented them first for natural language semantics was Richard Montague.
In the case of discourse representation another kind of lifting takes place.
Instead of just interpreting a piece of discourse in context, a second context
is returned that can be interpreted in context next, according to the recipe:
φc = λc′ 7→ φcc′.
To define truth, one has to step out of the continuation, by means of:
T (φc) = ∃c′(φcc′).
Truth is a derived notion. To say that a text is true in context c boils down
to the statement that the context c can be extended to c′, all relative to
some model M in which c is embedded.
Besides the connections with type theory and continuations, there is a link
with dynamic logic and Hoare style correctness reasoning in programming.
DPL, a close cousin of DRT, can be viewed as a fragment of quantified
dynamic logic. For the tracing of this connection we refer to [25]. For a
still broader perspective on natural language text processing as information
processing we refer to [43], in particular Chapter 3, ‘Meaning in Context’.
Discourse representation theory has found its way into implementations of
large scale natural language processing systems. A prominent example of
this is the aptly named Boxer system for building and manipulating DRT
box representations of natural language texts. See [15].
Speaking very generally, discourse is an act of communication that estab-
lishes common knowledge between a speaker and an audience. As the dis-
course processes, speaker and audience may switch roles. Beliefs are updated
in the course of communication, but the discourse situation also employs
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common knowledge and common belief (what the speaker knows or believes
about the audience) to establish communication. The update idea that an-
nouncing a proposition φ removes all worlds where φ does not hold is old
logical folklore; explicit statements can be found since the 1970s in the works
of Stalnaker, Heim, and others. The same idea also served as a high-light
in the work on epistemic logic in computer science (cf. [28]). Its first imple-
mentation as a dynamic-epistemic logic is due to Plaza [53] (see also [32]).
The public announcement update idea was generalized in [5]; a streamlined
version of a general logic of communication and change is in [10], and a text-
book treatment is in [18]. In the last chapter of [27] a textbook treatment
of presupposition and question answering within this framework is given.
The study of social mechanisms may offer an extended agenda for natural
language analysis, with the analysis of natural language communication in
settings where something more definite than just information exchange is
the focus: achievement of some well stated goals given by specific social
protocols. See [51] and [26].
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